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PREFACE
This;- work is the nesu.lt of a search foe a solution to a personal 
dilemma. Having been raised in the Christian tradition since 
birth,, my reading in the field of Biblical and Religious Studies 
at tertiary level brought me into contact with other relig.rous 
beliefs. This contact was not solely restricted to academic 
studies as many of my fellow students# who became personal 
friends# were adherents of non-Christian faiths. This experience 
led me seriously to question the claim to absoluteness on the 
part of my faith. I was no longer convinced that non-Christians 
were the "heathens" that Christian theology made them out to be.
My studies led me to the realisation that my particular faith was 
but one amongst many. Secondly, it became clear to me that I had 
spent most of my years in strict isolation from other religious 
beliefs. Thirdly, it dawned on me that I was a Christian by 
virtue of my geographical and sociological situation. Had I# for 
example, been born in India# the probability exists that I would 
have been raised in either the Hindu or the Muslim faith.
Given this situation, I was now faced with a serious multi- 
fat eted problem. Was I to abandon my Christian tradition m  
favour of a new faith? Was I to stand firm in my faith and 
defend it against these others?
perhaps, after all, my doubts of certain Christian beliefs were 
just a massing fancy. Was I, therefore, to tolerate other 
beliefs in the hope that they would one day see the light and 
accept Christianity as the ultimate revelation of God to mankind? 
This option was most problematic as I felt that if God had meant 
Christianity to be the final revelation to man, then I could not 
comprehend His reasoning behind sending another final revelation, 
namely, Islam.
As I saw it, the only solution to this dilemma was for me to 
enter into dialogue with these other beliefs in order that I 
might understand the diversity of the revelation of God to 
mankind. I could not foresee a historical world in which 
Christianity would finally truimph. Nor could I contemplate a 
God who was prepared to destroy most of mankind for persevering 
in their traditional mode of revering Him.
Having reached this point, the next problem that I faced was that 
of working out a feasible basis according to which this dialogue 
could take place. The major world religions are radically 
different from one another. Furthermore, the absolutist claims 
of both Christianity and Islam present a great stumbling-block in 
the path of meaningful dialogue. Therefore, the centra1 tenets 
of each of the major world religions will be outlined in chapter 
one of this work so as to put the problem of religious pluralism 
into perspective for the reader.
in view of this problem, the question arises as to the 
possibility of these faiths being able to interact in dialogic 
encounter. This question led ire to read intensively in the 
fields of philosophy and history of religions; a venture that 
proved to be a startling revelation. I realised that I was not 
alone in harbouring the above thoughts. The plethora of 
publications on the issue of religious pluralism indicated that 
many shared the same concerns and were groping towards a solution 
whereby mutual concord between religions could be achieved.
The call for interfaith dialogue has currently come under the 
spotlight as being the most realistic way of arriving at a 
solution to the problem of the conflicting truth-claims of world 
religions. Many feel that insight and mutual appreciation of the 
non-negotiable aspects of the various truth-claims can lead to 
greater harmony. It is also felt that such dialogue is feasible, 
despite the differences that exist between religions, in view of 
the fact that they all have a "common essence", namely; God. A 
critical evaluation of this basic philosophy will therefore be 
undertaken in chapter two.
The "common essence" approach to religious pluralism, however, 
raises the problem of relativism. It has the potential of 
reducing the world religions to mere relative entities for the 
sake of brotherhood. If each religion accepted that it is a mere 
relative entity, then there would be no conflicting truth-claims 
problem. Such an approach, however, would rob a particular
'xi
religion of its essence and meaning for its particular adherents. 
Chapter three will therefore deal with the historicist world-view 
as propounded by the late Ernst Troeltsch as an attempt to solve 
the problem of relativism. This world-view deeply impressed me 
as being a feasible solution to the problem of religious 
pluralism. It may therefore surprise the reader to find a rather 
negative critique of Troeltsch's application of historicist 
principles to the field of religion towards the end of the 
chapter. This is necessary in order to indicate to the reader 
the reasons for Troeltsch's non-prominence in more current 
attempts to solve the problem of religious pluralism. There is 
an apparent anomaly in his thought pattern.
Chapter three will culminate in a comparison between the 
historicist method per se and the "common essence" view that was 
outlined in Chapter two. The fundamental historicist basis of 
these attempts will be indicated. Whereas Troeltsch may have 
misapplied his own principles to the field of religion, it is 
evident that he was able to articulate the basic ground-rules 
which have governed all attempts at interreligious dialogue on 
the basis of commonality.
Historicist principles allow for a final revelation from God that 
lies beyond the historical realm. Thus, in chapter four, the 
eschatological approach to the problem of religious pluralism 
will be highlighted. This examination will, however, be limited 
to Judaism and Christianity only. The second half of this
k.ii
chapter looks forward to the near future by anticipating the 
centenary of the 'World Parliament of Religions' (Chicago, 1893). 
A review of this event in the light of the more recent interfaith 
debase serves as an orientation towards the activities of the 
proposed 1993 sitting.
My thanks go to my wife, Delia, for typing the script and for all 
the encouragement she has given along the way. Also to St. 
George's Home for Boys, in particular Mr Ken McHolm and Mr John 
Power, for their arrangement of financial assistance through the 
Henry Dawson Clement Trust of Metboard Ltd. I would like to 
express my gratitude to my colleagues at the Pretoria College of 
Education for all their encouragement and assistance in this 
venture. Lastly, I wish to thank my mentors, Dr. Jocelyn Hellig 
and Professor Ben Engelbrecht of the Department of Religious 
Studies , University of the Witwatersrand, for all their 
assistance.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODDCTION : DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM
1. CONTACT BETWEEN RELIGIONS.
The communications revolution of the twentieth century has 
resulted in daily contact between peoples across the globe. 
Total isolation of any community from the rest of mankind is now 
well-nigh impossible. The world has become a "global village".
Sir Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1940s39 - 40) is of the opinion 
that man's feeling of fellowship with the whole of humanity is 
implanted in his nature, despite the imposition on him of such 
artificial restrictions as tribe, race, and nation. He believes 
that this fundamental humanity of man wells up on occasions. So, 
for example; "When there is an earthquake in Japan or a famine in 
India, an explosion in a mine in Great Britain ... our hearts go 
out to the victims. When there is an act of heroism or daring, 
an achievement of genius in science or art, we feel elated and do 
not pause to ask the religion or the race to which the author 
belongs."
This intense awareness of a sense of global community 
has brought the various religions of mankind into much closer
*For the purposes of this work, attention will only be paid 
to the five major world religions: Hinduism, Buddhism,
Judaism, Christianity and Islam.
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/contact with each other than has been the case in the past. No 
longer do adherents of these beliefs live in isolated societies 
at different ends of the globe. This has made it obvious that, 
as far as religion is concerned, societies have become 
pluralistic in character and any particular faith is but one 
amongst many.
Wilfred Cantwell Smith (1962a:ll) states the above point thus: 
"No longer are people of other persuasions peripheral or distant, 
the idle curiosities of travellers' tales. The more alert we 
are, and the more involved in life, the more we are finding that 
they are our neighbours, our colleagues, our competitors, our 
fellows. Confucians and Hindus, Buddhists and Muslims, are with 
us not only in the United Nations, but down the street. 
Increasingly, not only is our civilisations destiny affected by 
their actions; but we drink coffee with them personally as well."
Religious coexistence, however, does not erase the fact that 
these beliefs differ from each other as to the nature of Truth. 
In particular, it does not alter the major stumbling-block that 
lies in the path of an enpathetic understanding amongst 
different faiths; the absolutist stance of both Christianity and 
Islam. Given this situation, religious pluralism has the 
potential of becoming analogous to a fermentation pot, the lid 
of which has not been properly secured. The resultant process 
is able to blast the lid completely away, for the 
"battle of the religions" continues on a ideological level and at
i
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times still manifests itself in the form of violence.
Thus, the issue of the conflicting truth claims of different 
religions "emerges as a major topic demanding a prominent place 
on the agenda of the philosopher of religion today and in the 
future" (Hick, 1973a:119).
2. THE CONFLICTING TRUTH CLAIMS
A precise definition of any of the major world religions is 
almost impossible. This is especially due to the fact that 
within each, there exists a diversity of forms and thus one must 
avoid any generalisations. What follows, therefore, is a brief 
description of the central tenets of each faith with a view to 
highlighting the points at which conflict arises.
2.1 THE EASTERN RELIGIONS
2.1.1 HINDUISM
*
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru describes Hinduism thus : "Hinduism
as a faith is vague, amorphous, many-sided, all things to all 
men. It is hardly possible to define it, sr, indeed to say 
definitely whether it is a religion or not, in the usual sense of
*This quotation is cited by Ringgren and Strfim from Nehru's: 
The Discovery of India (1946), the full bibliographical 
details of which are not cited.
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the word. In its present form, and even in the past, it embraces 
many beliefs and practices, from the highest to the lowest, often 
opposed or contradicting each other" (Nehru in Ringgren and 
StrOm, 1967:334 - 335).
This religion is not known to have stemmed from the teachings 
of any single founder. It has no prescribed rituals, dogmas or 
creeds that are universal to it and, despite widespread 
allegiance to a collection of sacred writings known as the Veda, 
is also not dependent on any single authoritative sciipture.
Strictly speaking, Hinduism is also not a missionising faith 
as it pertains only to the 'peoples of India'. Whilst 
outsiders may aspire to it, converts are not accepted and birth 
into a Hindu family is the only means of entry.
*R.C.Zaehner points out that the absence of dogma in Hinduism 
can be overemphasized. Some presuppositions, despite the 
wide diversity of practices, are rarely, if ever disputed. 
These are 'samsara', 'karma', 'moksha'/ 'mukti and 
'sanatana dharma', zaehner, R.C, (1977). Hinduism, 
Reprint. London: Oxford University Press, pp. 4 - 5
**In the present day, Hinduism has begun to missionise. 
Disciples of Swami Vivekenanda have been active in America. 
In Europe there are mission stations in London and at Gretz 
near Paris. See: Ringgren, H. and StrOm, A. Religions of 
mankind. Edinburgh and London: Oliver and Boyd, pp.334 -33j .
gee "also: Sooklal, A. (1987). "The Hare Krishna movement
in south Africa." In: Religion in Southern Africa, vol._ 8, 
no. 2. July, pp.19 - 21; where a brief historical 
perspective is given of the "International Society fot 
Krishna Consciousness" (ISKCON) which was established by 
Srila Prabhupada in New York with a view to gaming 
converts. Of the seven stated purposes of this movement, 
the second expressly declares that it is "to propogate a 
consciousness of Krishna, as it is revealed in the Bhagavad 
Gita and Srimad Bhagwatam." (Sooklal, 1987:20).
*This apparent exclusivism must not be misunderstood. Throughout 
its history, this religion has shown itself to be ready to absorb 
and adopt ideas and norms from elswhere. This fact explains its 
amorphous nature. In any event, the concept of 'samsara' allows 
all individuals the opportunity for birth into a Hindu family, 
and thereby a chance at attaining 'mukti'.
Hinduism clashes with the Abrahamic faiths because of its 
apparent polytheistic nature. Arguably, it can be shown to be a 
polytheistic, faith in that its adherents revere God in many 
diverse forms. For the educated Hindu, however, the religion has 
a distinctly monotheistic character. This is apparent in the Rig 
Veda in the statement: "The Real is One, though sages name it 
variously" (Rig Veda, i.164.46.).
Despite this argument for the monotheistic nature of Hinduism, 
the fact that many other gods are revered, especially in tangible 
forms, is not likely to lead to a widely accepted change in 
attitude towards it on the part of the Abrahamic faiths. To the 
Abrahamic faiths, such practices are idolatrous.
The Hindu concept of 'sanatana dharma' with its widely accepted 
axiom, namely, the concept of the transmigration of souls 
(samsara) also contradicts the view of the Abrahamic faiths, 
Samsara holds that one's individual soul (atman) passes through a 
series of rebirths, History is thus a cyclic process as opposed 
to the linear process advocated by the Abrahamic faiths,
5
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Samsara provides a philisophical solution to the problem of evil 
in the world in that the condition into which the soul is reborn
depends upon one's good or bad actions (karma). Thus, if people
are sick, poor, or oppressed, then it is taken for granted that 
they have deserved it, if not in this life then in some previous 
existence (Parrinder,1968:31). Although there is a link with 
the reward-punishirent ethic that is found in different forms in 
the Abrahamic faiths, the above solution to the existence of evil 
differs radically from their viewpoint of a single eschatological 
judgement after which evil will be eradicated.
The Hindu aims ultimately to escape rebirth by seeking release
(moksha/mukti), which is possible to all despite the divergent 
philosophical views as to how it should be attained. Many Hindus 
accept the view laid down in the so-called "Identity Texts" of 
the Upanishads, namely that release is gained when one has 
realised that there is no difference between the individual soul 
(atman) and Brahman (Smart, 1969:124 - 125). This concept of 
Brahman-Atman? that divinity inheres in man, is unacceptable to 
the Abrahamic faiths in which there is a clear separation between 
creator and creation.
'Brahman' can be understood in a variety of ways from the 
abovementioned inpersonal 'Absolute' (universal soul or being) to 
the personal Lord, Ishvara. Some Hindus, therefore, experience 
the phenomenal world as an illusion (maya). Brahman is the only 
Reality that exists and all things are one with it (advaita).
j,
Radhakrishnan (1940:31) emphasises that Reality (Brahman) and 
existence are not to be set against each other as metaphysical 
contraries. By 'advaita* and 'maya', one must understand that 
"nothing on earth is utterly perfect or utterly without 
perfection." Therefore, those who have the vision of perfection 
(Brahman) strive continually to increase the perfection and 
diminish the imperfection by striving to become one with Brahman.
Other Hindus do not experience reality in terms of maya-advaita. 
These deny that man and God are one because if this were so, 
there would be no possibility of man worshipping God. They 
further argue that if man were indeed God, "then he ought to be 
axl-wise and all-powerful, and no man is that" (Parnnder, 
1968:21). Thus they developed the concept of 'dvaita' whereby, 
through the personal commitment to God (in whatever form he is 
revered), release from samsara is also possible.
2.1.2 BUDDHISM
The Buddha rebelled against many t^pects of Hinduism.
Primarly, he opposed its methods of *"hic ing liberation and 
offered instead a clear-cut path towards the a tainment thereof. 
He also laid no great stress on the worship of Hindu gods, whom 
he regarded as beinn impermanent like other living beings
(Smart, 1969:121).
These differences with Hinduism should not be seen in terms of 
violent conflict. Buddha did not campaign for any crusade 
against Hindu believers. Whilst it is true that Buddha offered 
the Four Noble Truths as the only way to cure the ills of 
humankind in the world and also that he perceived his mission as 
a cosmic one, such absolutism was at least accompanied by 
tolerance. The fact that Hinduism later absorbed Buddhist 
teaching as part of its diversity serves to illustrate the lack 
of any real conflict between the two. The Buddha's attitude to 
gods, however, does stand in sharp conflict with Abrahamic 
monotheism. Apart from his teaching that they are impermanent 
and thus also need to escape rebirth, he also held that the gods 
have no spiritual power. They do not know the secret of 
existence, except insofar as they listen to the Bucdha himself. 
He is above the gods (Smart, 1969:121).
•' r -4
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D.T. Suzuki (1969:71) sees the doctrine of no-soul (anatta) as 
being the feature which distinguishes Buddhism from all other 
religions, Edward Conze (1969:62) sees the doctrine as 
comprising two statements, namely: "It is claimed th.it nothing 
in reality corresponds to such words or ideas as 'mine',
'belonging', etc. In other words, the self is not a fact, We 
are urged to consider that nothing in our empirical self is 
worthy of being regarded as the real self." This promotion of 
the ego is the cause of humankind's pain in the world,
The term which the Buddha ascribed to the state of liberation is
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that of 'Nirvana'. As to the exact meaning of this concept there 
is little clarity. The one affirmative quality that the Buddha 
did venture was that of 'Bliss'. Etymologieslly the word means 
'to blow out' , "not transitively but as a fire ceases to draw 
fuel. D ep ri ve d  of fuel it goes out" (Smith, 1965:125 - 126).
What it essentially means, therefore, is that once one has 
managed to divorce himself from desire, the cause of all 
suffering, then there will be no rebirth. One drops all 
behaviour patterns which would promote the ego or self and 
continue to fuel the pain and dislocation of life (dukkha).
Some comparative religionists argue that Nirvana is a God- 
concept, or is as close to an equivalent as Buddhism allows in 
the sense of an inspiration and goal of effort. The vocabulary 
used to describe it is very similar to that used to describe God: 
'unknown', 'infinite', 'indestmctable'. Parrinder (1968:51) 
comments that "perhaps a closer analogy is the kingdom of heaven, 
or heaven itself purged of symbolism.
today Buddhism manifests itself in two distinct forms, namely, 
Theravada and Mahayana. An interesting aspect of Mahayana is its 
concept that salvation is open to all by means of the 
'bodhisattva' (BUddhas-to-be). According to this doctrine, the 
Buddha -to-be acquires, through his countless lives of self 
sacrifice, a virtually infinite store of merit, out of this 
great store he can distribute merit to the otherwise unworthy 
faithful. The person who calls on the Bodhisattva in faith will, 
on death, be reborn in paradise - not through his own merits,
9
but through the Bodhisattva's (Smart,1969: 134 - 135), Here,
Buddhism comes close to the Judaeo-Christian idea of the 
vicarious suffering of an individua] on behalf of others. It is 
also particularly similar to the idea of Christ being sent to 
die for mankind in order that they might have salvation. The 
radical differences between the Bodhisattva and Christian 
teaching are, however, self evident.
Increased metaphysical speculation on the bodhisattva ideal led 
to the transmogrification of the Buddha into a God. The 'Pure 
Land' sect in particular developed a theory of belief in 
celestial Buddhas who could be worshipped and prayed to in order 
that one might attain Nirvana. However, not all Mahayana schools 
sanction Buddha worship. Many apply the Theravadan principle 
that the gods deter one from the goal.
Whilst Buddha worship would be acceptable to Hindus because of 
their tolerance of the worship of many deities, this practice is
incompatible with that of the Abrahamic faiths, Judaism and 
Islam do not accept that God can be incarnated in human form. 
Christianity, on the other hand, does accept such a theory, but 
the belief that this took place "once and for all" in the person 
Jesus, renders Buddha's divine status "irrelevant" and 
"misleading".
Despite the divergent schools of Buddhism, Christmas Humphreys 
(1951:51 - 52) points out that they exist in tolerance side by
10
side. Citing Suzuki, he further points out that: "There are not 
two Buddhisms? the Mahayana and the Hinayana are one, and the 
spirit of the founder of Buddhism prevails in both. Each has 
developed in its own way, according to the difference in 
envirJinent in which each has thriven and grown, understanding by 
enviroment all those various factors of life that make up the
peculiarities of an individual or nation."
2.2 THE APRAHAMIC FAITHS
2.2.1 JUDAISM
As the 'children of Abraham', the Jews believe in the one God. 
This God differed from the many other deities that were being 
revered in the Ancient Near East at that time. These tended to 
have a higher or lower status in a particular pantheon. By
contrast, Yahweh (the name by which this God eventually became 
known) was monotheistic in character.
This point immediately separates Judaism from the Eastern 
religions. The view that there is only one God is not compatible 
with the concepts of deity of the religions discussed above.
A further point that leads to e parting of the ways with the East
is the Jewish view of creation. Yahweh, the eternal, is the
creator of all that is for the manifestation of his glory. He is 
the supreme ruler over all that exists, Thus Judaism has a
definite starting point for history - the creation. This event 
is viewed as a positive occurrence and is unlike the Eastern 
viewpoint discussed above where one finds a constant search to 
escape from the phenomenal world and its suffering. Judaism is a 
world-affirming and not a world-denying faith (Allen, 1981:43).
According to the Hebrew Bible, God makes Himself known to His
creation through revelation. The key revelatory event is the
Exodus? through which the power of Yahweh over nature and history 
had been proven. Hyam Maccoby (1984:63) points out that for
Judaism, the deliverance from Egypt is "an event from which all
else flows." It had a marked effect on the God-concept of this 
new faith in that with the eruption of monotheism, it "postulated 
a cod who transcends all cyclical processes, and who acts only in 
accordance with his untrammelled will." In this instance, he had 
chosen to deliver the Jews from bondage, thus, the Hebrew Bible 
strikes the note of thankfulness to God throughout its contents.
For this reason, the Jews see the entire historical process as 
'Salvation History'. History is the arena for the unfolding of 
God's plan of salvation for all mankind. This plan involved 
Israel in a very special way in that it was to her that God chose 
to reveal his Law (Torah) via Moses at Mount Sinai. There a 
covenant was made between God and Israel in the form of the 
Decalogue, which formed the basis of a legal system which governs 
every aspect of life (The six hundred and thirteen mizvot).
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This covenant "was a new relationship to a sole deity 
who would lead them and protect them" (Smart, 1969:347). 
However, in return the Israelites were under obligation to walk 
in the way of their God as laid down by the Torah. He had made 
them a 'Chosen People1 (Deut. 7:6ff) - a nation 'set apart' from 
other nations as God's own possession in order that they might 
practise His ways and make them known to the nations of the 
world. If Israel remained faithful to this covenant, she would 
be rewarded in that "she would dwell safely in the land which had 
been promised to her. infidelity to the covenant obligations 
would result in exile from that land" (Hellig, 1985:1). 
However, despite the fact that Israel could be punished for not 
observing the TOrah, her chosenness could never be annulled.
*
Jocelyn Hellig (1985:1) points out that this doctrine of 
chosenness is quite clearly a potential area for explosive 
misunderstanding, and, therefore, a source of anti-Semitism. 
"Implicit in the doctrine is the belief that what has happened to 
Jews, and what continues to happen to them, is at the centre of 
human history" (Hellig, 1986:1). It is largely for this reason 
that antagonism of the Jews arose. "Without their supernatural
*Also: Hellig, J. (1987). "The Doctrine of Chosenness and
Anti-Semitism." Unpublished, p.l.
**Hellig defines anti-Semitism as: "an imprecise term which 
has come to denote the irrational hatred of the Jewish 
people, the demonisation and thus dehumanisation of them, 
and the ascription to the Jews of cosmic powers of evil. 
See: Hellig, J. (1987). "The Doctrine of Chosenness and
Anti-Semitism." Unpublished, p.3.
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role in human history, it is unlikely that there would be such 
irrational hatreds of them, nor that they would be subjected to 
impossible standards of morality, not expected of any other 
people in the world" (Hellig, 1986:7).
Rosemary Ruether (1974), in her examination of the rivalry 
between the Jews and the Christian Church, points out that 
although anti-Judaism was prevalent in the pre-Christian pagan 
world, this was not nearly as bad as the later anti-Semitism that 
was espoused by the Christian Church. She states (1974:28) that 
"we must recognise Christian anti-Semitism as a uniquely new 
factor in the picture of antique anti-Semitism." Their anti- 
Semitism is of course inextricably linked to their understanding 
of the doctrine of chosenness which will be highlighted in 2.2.2 
below as an area of conflict.
The doctrine of chosenness presents the Jews as being a 
particularistic people with a particularistic faith that excludes 
all others. The former premise is, of course, true; especially 
if one considers such instances as the attempt by Nehemiah and 
Ezra in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., to restrict 
marriages to those of Jewish birth only (Ezra 10:2 / Neh. 
13:23ff), and the later Maccabean resistance to Syrian 
intervention.
The latter premise, however, needs further qualification as there 
exists in Judaism a "strange tension" between Jewish
particularism and the universalism that is also implied in Jewish 
monotheism (Hellig, 1985:5). Thus, as Emil F kenheim (1966,54) 
puts it: "only an infinite and therefore universal God can single 
out the particular." Hellig (1985:4) points out that 
monotheism dictates that God is universal. "If there is only one 
God, the Jews must be chosen for a purpose." She defines this 
purpose as follows: "A particular people, a holy and treasured 
people, through following a holy way of life, will ultimately 
lead the entire world to knowledge of the Lord" (Hellig,
1987:2).
This purpose should not be misunderstood as meaning that Israel 
has the only path to redemption. Citing Isaiah 19:25, Ruether 
(1974:236) points out that: "God is the God of both Israel and
the other peoples, each in their own histories and contexts. ... 
All may join Israel, but all need not join Israel or adopt its
specific identity to be saved."
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The universal nature of monotheism does not dictate that 
Gentiles need to adhere to the six hundred and thirteen mizvot. 
According to rabbinical  ^tradition, they need only 
follow the Seven Noahide Laws. Thus provision is made for the 
"righteous pagan" to be included in God's eschatological kingdom. 
However, the question remains as to whether the Seven Noahide 
Laws are sufficient in order to include all mankind in God's 
salvific plan. According to Judaism they are. The point is how 
other religions perceive this Jewish claim. It has the potential 
of being regarded as aristocratic conceit.
in any event, this salvific plan which is to be ushered in on the
'Day of Yahweh' by a Messiah is inextricably linked to a national 
redemption of the neople, Israel. The problem thus arises as bo
whether such a view of redemption, although it does have 
universal overtones (cf. Micah 4:1-5) will in fact cater for 
all mankind.
in terms of the conflicting truth-claims, it must also be noted
WB
□cASRtiRsed." Unollblished. p.9.
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that the idea of a national redemption of Israel differs from 
the Eastern belief in the denial of the phenomenal world. It is 
also in conflict with the Christian viewpoint of universal 
redemption via faith in a personal saviour.
2.2.2 CHRISTIANITY
This religion follows on the 'salvation history' of Judaism by 
seeing its fulfillment in the life, death and resurrection of 
Jesus of Nazareth. This belief remains the "central fact" of the 
Christian faith, despite the many diverse forms in which it 
manifests itself (Hick, 1983:17).
The prime source for the life and teachings of Jesus is the New 
Testament. The conservative Christian viewpoint is that this 
document, along with the Hebrew Bible, forms a unit which is the 
divinely inspirea Word of God. In terms of modern historiography, 
however, the reflection of the main figure of the Christian faith 
as presented in the New Testament is a highly problematical one. 
Factors such as discrepancies in details? accurate origin; dating 
and authorship of the documents? and the time gap between the 
life of Jesus and the written account thereof, make it impossible 
for one to determine exactly what Jesus said and did.
The more liberal view of the Christian New Testament is that it 
consists of the writings of a community who wish to preserve the 
memory of Jesus. Thus, stories of Jesus flowed into a kind of
17
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corporate memory, which lived powerfully on. These memories 
became part of the consciousness of the church, interacting in 
its life with the other factors that affected it and becoming 
embodied in documentary form as the New Testament picture of 
Jesus as Lord and Saviour (Hick, 1983:58).
Leaving these two views of the New Testament aside, it is 
apparent from the Gospels that the basic message propagated by 
Jesus was that the promised 'Messiah' that was expected by 
Judaism, had in fact arrived in his person; and thus the 
envisaged eschatological 'Kingdom of God' was now at hand. This 
was the 'good news' proclaimed by him and to which he urged 
people to turn by means of repentance (cf. Mark 1:14 -15). This 
message in effect means that the promises contained in the Hebrew 
Bible had culminated and had been fulfilled in Jesus. "I am the 
way, the truth and the life, no man comes to the Father except 
through me" (John 14:6).
Such an approach to the Hebrew scriptures led to their being 
incorporated with the new documents at the time of the
canonization of the Christian Bible. Christians recognise that
the same God speaks in both the Old and New Testament, however,
they believe that it is only through the New Gospel that the Old
Testament is rightly to be understood. This understanding of the 
Hebrew Bible is highly problematic in terms of Jewish-Christian 
relations. The irony of this situation is that Christianity 
could not totally reject Jewish belief because her teachings were
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greatly dependent on the promises contained therein. Therefore, 
Hellig (1986:3) argues that "continued Jewish existence is, from 
one perspective, a verification of the truth of Christianity, and 
from another, a scandal which threatens the truth-claims of 
Christianity."
Richard L. Rubenstein (1966:194) points out that, in actual fact, 
Christianity cannot be understood apart from its own chosen- 
people doctrine; the claim that the Church has replaced the 
Synagogue as the New Israel. Because of the special role claimed 
by the Jew in the divine drama, he assumes inordinate importance 
for Christianity as chosenness passed from the Old Israel to the 
New Israel. This results in dynamics of jealousy not unlike 
those operative in sibling rivalry as to which son is the 
Father's favourite.
But, the question must be raised as to whether this description 
of the conflict between Judaism and Christianity as mere "sibling 
rivalry" is apt. Ruether (1974) points out that the Christians 
took this rivalry much further by developing it into a perfidious 
anti-Semitism. Troubled by the Jewish refusal to accept her 
message, the Church tried to find in her scriptures the 
prediction of the "blindness" of Israel (Baum, 1974:12). This 
'blindness' was to assume great significance with regard to 
discrediting the status of Jewisti religious law, leadership, 
worship, and even its history.
"The crux of the conflict lay in the fact that the Church
*
erected its imssianic midrash into a new f>r inciple of 
salvation. For Christianity, salvation was now found no longer 
in any observances - ritual or ethical - founded on the Torah of 
Moses, representing the covenant of the past. Rather, salvation 
was now found solely through faith in the messianic exegesis of 
the Church about the salvic role of Jesus as Prophet - King - son 
of man, predicted by the prophets (Ruether, 1974:78). The 
writings of the apostle, Paul, had a profound influence on the 
Church in its formulation of the above teaching.
Norman Ravitch (1982:45) points out that the Church's insistence 
on maintaining the connection with the Jewish Scriptures fatally 
and necessarily led it to attack the living people Israel. 
Citing Arnold Toynbee , Ravitch points to the example of Marcion, 
who wanted to relativize the Hebrew Bible in relation to the 
Christian faith. Had Marcion not been declared a heretic by the 
Church, and had his views become accepted Christian practice, 
Christianity might have left the Jews alone as another irrelevant 
religious sect in the great religious cauldron of the Middle-
The blame for the deification of Jesus and the transformation of
*Midrash is a term applied to the rabbinical method of 
interpretation of scripture. The rabbis adhered to set laws 
for such hermeneutic, for example, the Seven Laws of Hillel. 
Paul, having grown up in the rabbinical tradition, 
this hermeneutic method to reveal the ^ fulfilment of 
promises contained in the Hebrew Bible in Christ*
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the Hebrew Bible into this new Messianic hope is laid by many 
biblical scholars on Paul of Tarsus. Paul Johnson (1976:37 
39), however, points out that the new doctrine was not invented 
by Paul, but that everything in it had already been implicit in 
the teachings of Jesus. What Paul had succeeded in doing was to 
Hellenize Jesus' message, thus making Judaic monotheism 
accessible to the entire Roman World.
Johnson (1976:38) , however, contradicts himself by stating that 
it was inevitable that Paul's gospel would clash with Judaism, 
especially insofar as he introduced a new attitude to the Torah. 
"For him the law became a curse, for no man could fulfil its 613 
commands and prohibitions completely; thus it made sinners of 
everyone. In some ways it was a direct incentive to sin" 
(Galatians 3 / Romans 6 - 9 ).
Closely linked to Paul's refutation of salvation via adherence to 
the Jewish Law is the Christian concept of the new and 'true' 
Israel, The Church took over the Jewish concept of the chosen 
people and changed the criteria for membership. Physical descent 
was no longer valid, but only belief in Jesus Christ (Romans 
2:28f.;9:6ff.).
Ruether (1977:81) sums up the consequences of this negation of
*0n this issue, however, Paul suffers from a great deal of 
ambiguity in that elsewhere (cf. Romans 7:12, 22, 25)
purports the Law to be holy and good.
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Torah as follows s "The dialectic of judgement and promise is 
rendered schizophrenic, applied not to one elect people, but to 
two peoples; the reprobate people, the Jews, and the future elect 
people of the promise, the Church."
The reestablishment of the State of Israel in 1948 has caused 
tremendous problems for Christianity's view of itself as the 
"new" and "true" Israel. Because of the Christian view that the 
Jews were blind to the truth of Jesus' message, there arose
within Christianity a highly developed theology which claimed 
that Jews, for the remainder of human history, were to be
subjected to continual suffering and to live in a state of
perpetual wandering without a homeland as a punishment for their 
grave sinfulness (Pawlikowski, 1980:1).
The prime reason such a punishment lay in the accusation (which 
was based on tue New Testament accounts of the trial of Jesus) 
that because the Jews had crucified Jesus, they had in fact
killed God. Thus the Jews had been responsible for deicide.
Since 70 AD until 1943, the Jews fitted into this theological 
mould. Until the Second coming they were to be the wandering, 
reprobate people, suffering because of their refusal to accept 
the truth of Christianity . This suffering served as positive
"a mSMe SS
York: The Seabury Press, pp.58 - 60.
proof that Christianity was indeed the new Israel. The Jewish 
return to Israel is, however, a contradiction of this viewpoint.
The Holocaust has also caused problems for conservative Christian 
theology. For many Christians, it has served to indicate exactly 
how un-Christian this anti-Semitism that found its roots in the
New Testament can beco„ie. In particular it has awoken many
Christians to the fact that despite their belief in the
redemption of the world through Jesus, the world is in fact still 
unredeemed.* As Baum (1974:7) puts it: "What the encounter of 
Auschwitz demands of Christian theologians, therefore, is that
they submit Christian teaching to a radical ideological
critique."
Sensitive Christians have taken up this challenge and are 
critically examining their scriptures to uncover the roots of the 
"teaching of contenpt". Names such as Rosemary Ruether, Gregory 
Baum, John Pawlikowski, Tom Driver, and Monika Hellwig, stand out 
as key figures in this quest. The implications of their findings 
for solving the problem of religious pluralism will be pursued in
chapter four.
2.2.3 ISLAM
The followers of this faith, Muslims, surrender to the will of
*See later discussion in Chapter Four.
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th e  one Goa - Allah. T h e i r  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  s c r i p t u r e s ,  the Q u r 'an
ace regarded by them as being the only, true account of
revelation. It is the eternal and uncreated infallible Word of 
God. Being as such it supersedes the scriptures of both Judaism 
and Christianity. The Old Testament and the New Testament are 
thus regarded as faulty records of true revelation.
This doctrine seems on the surface to have the potential for 
violent conflict with the judaeo-Christian tradition. Parrinder 
(1968:130) however, points out that although modem Muslims are 
of the opinion that the differences between the scriptures of 
these three faiths are due to corruptions of the Torah and the 
Gospel, the Qur'an itself does not express this sentiment. On 
the contrary it gives Jews and Christians a better status than 
pagans by describing them as 'people of the Book' (ahl-al-kitab). 
This is because they had received revelation from the one God. 
However, they are still regarded as second-class citizens
subjected to humiliation.
This special status as 'people of the Book' serves sonewhat to 
dampen the potential for conflict that exists between these three 
faiths. Hellig (1987:11) points out that this is so because 
Islam is not dependent on the word and letter of the scriptures 
of either of these faiths. Christianity had to coerce the 
fulfilment of the Old Testament in the events of the New 
Testament. Thus, Jews were "blind" to the meaning of their 
scripture as they did not agree to this "fulfilment". Because
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Islam sees the Old and New Testaments as faulty, there is no need 
to coerce an outcome from statements in scripture which preceded 
the Qur'an.
Nevertheless, both of these faiths failed to recognise Muhammed's 
revelation as being valid. This fact possibly explains the 
change in attitude (namely to one of outright rejection) that 
occurs in passages of the Qur'an which date to later years of 
Muhammed's life.
The Qur'an also emphasises that the genetic line of the great 
prophets had reached finality. This line is traced back to Adam 
and runs through Abraham to Jesus, but, ends with Muhammed. He 
is the last - the 'Seal' of the Prophets; for in him God's 
revelation reached finality (Smart, 1969:487). This emphasis on 
finality obviously negates the truth-claims of any other 
religion.
Islam does not base its entire belief on the Qur'an alone. 
During the first two centuries of its existence, theologians and 
lawyers worked on1- the 'Shari'a' - the 'Law' of Islam, from which 
a whole way of life emerged.
An interesting aspect of the above that is very pertinent to 
the problem of conflict'.g truth-claims is the Hadith which 
classifies Jews and Christians as 'dhimmis'. Because of their 
status as 'people of the Book', they enjoy a guarantee of
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security to life and property, p itection in the exercise of 
their religion and defence against others. They may not, 
however, become citizens of the Muslim state unless they convert 
wholly to Islam. They are also required to pay taxes to the 
Muslim state and must provide the necessary supplies for Jier 
armies when the need arises (Gibb and Kramers, 1953:75 - 76).
?
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These 'dhimmis' are distinguished from the 1kafirun1, a term that
was first applied by Muhammed to the unbelieving Meccans, but,
was later defined as referring to all infidels. It is these
people "who are threatened with God's judgement and Hell" (Gibb
**
and Krarrers, 1953:205 - 206). Thus whilst there appears to be 
a special dispensation for Christians and Jews as far as the Last 
Judgement is concerned, the Eastern Religions are definitely not 
tolerated. The scene is set for conflict.
In the early stages of Islamic expansion throughout the Arabic 
world, Muslims applied the practice of a 'Hc’y War' 
(jihad). This practice was continued as the faith was spread 
into Europe, India and Africa. Gradually the military aspect of 
the jihad waned and it never cane to be regarded as one of the 
'Pillars' of the faith (Parrinder, 1968;136). Nevertheless,
♦This article also appears in: Houtsma, M. Th. ed. (1913). 
The Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol. 1. Leiden: E.J.Brill;
London: Luzac and Co, pp.958 - 959.
♦♦This article also appears in: Houtsma, M. Th. ed. (1927). 
The Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol. 2. Leiden: E.J.Brill;
London: Luzac and Co, pp.618 -620.
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militancy in Islam is very important. The world is divided into 
two basic arenas: 'Dar al Islam' (the territory of Islam) and 
'Dar al Barb' (the territory of war). By implication, therefore, 
the entire world must be won over for Islam.
This aspect of Islam remains problematic for modern times even 
though most Muslim teachers nowadays take the territory of war to 
mean war against sin in oneself. Many of the current Muslim 
sects have revived the military understanding of the jihad 
concept and are currently "at war" , either against the influx of 
Western ideas into Muslim society, or in the name of the spread 
of Islam in various states.
3. FACING THE PROBLEM
The above brief outline of these religious beliefs serves to 
indicate their potential for explosive collision. Despite past 
attenpts on the part of any particular faith to establish itself 
as the only true religion, the different beliefs have survived as 
separate entities and show no signs of fading from the arena of 
history.
The "global village", however, toes not allow a total separation 
of the different religious cultures. The question thus arises as 
to whether or not it is possible for them to coexist on the basi', 
of mutual understanding in the light of such diversity.
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in this regard, Hinduism with its amorphous nature, has no major 
problems. Because it does not prescribe the courses of action or 
beliefs to be held by other religions, each individual may 
worship the god or gods of his own choice. In any event, the 
concept of 'samsara' allows all individuals the opportunity for 
birth into a Hindu family and thereby a chance at attaining
'mukti'.
Buddhism too has tended to be tolerant in the face of religious 
diversity. Tho Buddhist solution to the conflicting truth-claims 
problem is perhaps best depicted in the story related by the 
Buddha concerning a certain king of Benares who gathered together 
a number of beggars who had been blind from birth and offered a 
prize to the one who should c ' ve him the best account of an 
elephant. Each beggar felt a different part of the elephant and 
proceeded to describe what he perceived to be the truth 
pertaining to the phenomenon "elephant". And yet, not one could 
give a full description of the animal because they each 
experienced only a part of the truth.
So it is with the differing religions. Each sees Truth from its 
particular perspective whilst not knowing the full Truth. 
Radhakrishnan (1940:308) comments thus on the significance of the 
abovementioned Buddhist tale: "In theological discussions we are 
at best blind beggars fighting with one another." Nevertheless, 
the fact that the Buddha perceived his mission as a cosmic one 
and prescribed the Eightfold Path as the true path to salvation
serves to contradict the above.
The Abrahamic faiths pose the greatest threat to peaceful 
coexistence among men. The Jews claim to be God's chosen people. 
Christianity too makes this claim as the "New Israel" and holds 
firm to the belief that the salvation of mankind is only possible 
through belief in Jesus as God. Islam, in turn, claims to be the 
final revelation of God to man and that the Qur'an is the .only, 
true record of such revelation. All of these views set the scene 
for conflict rather than for peaceful dialogue. Not only do they 
stand in sharp opposition ho each other, but they also are 
contrary to fui danental Eastern philosophies.
Three possible solutions have been proposed according to which 
the problem that is posed by religious pluralism can be adressed. 
The first is that of synthesis by addition, which involves the 
adding together of the most important features of each faith so 
as to create a new uniform world faith. The second is that of 
synthesis b% reduction, which requires that all religions be 
reduced to "the smallest possible common denominator of which it 
may be assumed that all of them have it in common". The third is 
that of interfaith dialogue (Gensichen, 1976;33 - So).
In the light of the above outline of the conflicting truth- 
claims, it is evident that the proposal of synthesis by addition 
is doomed to failure. D.H.W. Gensichen (1976:33) spells out the 
reasons for this failure as follows;-
"Religions are not like machines, made up of component parts 
which can be exchanged at random or artificially combined in a 
new structure. Each religion is rather a living organism, 
animated by the faith of the believers and expressing itself m  
forms and symbols which cannot simply be transferred into a 
different setting."
Gensichen also rejects the solution of synthesis by reduction on 
the above grounds. He further comments (1976:34) that "the 
realities of religions, in the plural, militate against any such 
attempt at abstract reduction." Thus, he aligns his support with 
the third solution, namely, interfaith dialogue. Such a 
solution, for Gensichen, provides "a measure of realism which is 
able to take into account both the existing religions as they, 
are, in their particularity and peculiarity, and the school of 
secularism which is lading the religions to a reappraisal of 
their heritage which, again, will bear the peculiar stamp of the
respective religion."
This third solution has served as the prime motivation for the 
pursuit of this work. It has currently come under the spotlight 
of being the most realistic way of arriving at a solution to the 
problem of the conflicting truth-claims. However, it is the very 
nature of the peculiarity of each religion Wat gives rise to our 
problem. Thus to recognise peculiarity and yet at the same time 
to propose a dialogue that in the end will not lead to the 
breakdown of the very essence of the conflict, tamely,
particularity; is in my opinion, a hopeless ideal. It still does 
not solve the problem. However, many are of the opinion that 
insight and mutual appreciation of the non-negotiable aspects of 
the various truth-claims can lead to greater harmony.
The aim of this work is, therefore, threefold. Firstly it serves 
as a critical evaluation of the basic philosophy that underlies 
the call towards interfaith dialogue. This will be done in
chapter two by concentrating mainly on the models provided by two 
of the most renowned current proponents of interfaith dialogue, 
namely, Wilfred Cantwell Smith and John Hick. Their views, 
however, must not be seen in isolation from those who paved the 
way for the praxis of a global theology. Thus the views of Paul 
Tillich, Carl Gustav Jung and Arnold Toynbee will also form part 
of this analysis.
The key issue that will be raised by the above analysis is that 
of the reduction of the many particular faiths to mere relative 
entities. Thus, the second aim of this work will be the 
provision of a critical analysis of the model provided by Ernst
Troeltsch with regard to the problem of relativising religious
beliefs. This will be undertaken in chapter three.
Troeltsch attenpted to come to terms with the problem of
relativism by means of the historicist method. This method will 
be examined and the flaws will be pointed out. The culmination 
of this chapter, however, will be the proposal for the
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recognition that, despite the flaws in Troeltsch's argument, he 
was able to articulate the basic ground-rules from which students 
of religion are at least able to attempt to come to terms with 
the problem of religious pluralism. In this regard, it will be 
necessary to compare the historicist approacn to that of global 
theology as outlined in chapter two.
The third aim of this work, to be pursued in chapter four, will 
be to highlight the eschatological approach to the problem of the 
conflicting truth-claims. In this regard, the thoughts of 
Rosemary Ruether and Tom Driver are pertinent. This r.; ht strike 
the reader as being somewhat odd in terms of the proposal for the 
recognition of historicist principles as the basis for a feasible 
solution co the problem. The fact of the matter is that 
although, in my opinion, historicism does provide such a basis, 
inevitably it does not removt 'he conflict. Like interfaith 
dialogue it gropes towards a solution„ but the problem continues 
to exist.
Nevertheless, historicist principles do allow for a final 
revelation from God that lies beyond the historical realm. 
Perhaps such an approach is the only way of solving the problem 
of religious pluralism.
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CHAPTER 2 THE UNITIVE PLURALISTIC BASIS FOR IOTERFAITH 
DIALOGUE
1. INTRODUCTION
In the light of the discussion in the previous chapter concerning 
the conflicting truth-claims of different religions, it is 
evident that the student of religion is faced with a vexing 
problem. The beliefs and practices of the Eastern religions do
not seem to be at all compatible with those of the Abrahamic 
faiths. Also, the internal conflict that exists between the
latter faiths is in itself a fundamental problem. For all 
intents and purposes, therefore, the ideal of a wide-scale 
interfaith dialogue in order to overcome these areas of conflict 
appears to be a hopeless one.
Notwithstanding this dilemma, the "global village" has brought 
the world religions into increasing contact with one another and 
by so doing, has in effect, forced a confrontation of truth- 
claims. Yet, in the current age of detente in politics, the
tendency is towards solution of a conflict via mutual dialogue 
rather than violent encounter. As far as religion is concerned, 
therefore, there has been a strong move towards interfaith 
dialogue with a view to gaining insight and mutua1 appreciation 
of the non-negotiable aspects of the various truth-claims. It is
believed such an approach to the conflict can lead to
greater harmony.
The above viewpoint is largely governed by the belief that, 
despite the pecu’i cities of each particular faith, there exists 
a unity between them that is based on their common essence. 
Theorists of the comion essence of religions school, such as Paul 
Tillich (d. 1965), Carl Gustav Jung (d. 1961), Arnold Toynbee (d. 
1975), John Hick and Wilfred Cantwell Smith seek to identify the 
essential sameness of all religious beliefs, despite the obvious 
differences in outlook. According to them, once this is done, 
mutual dialogue becomes possible on the basis of what is common 
to all faiths and the path is open towards a unitive pluralism of 
world religions.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the views of Smith and 
Hick, two of the main proponents of the above view. Smith and 
Hick should not, however, be seen in isolation from other 
luminaries who reached such a thesis on the basis of their 
particular studies in the field of religion. In this regard, the 
models provided by three past exponents of the viewpoint, namely, 
Tillich, Jung, and Toynbee, will be examined briefly in order to 
provide an adequate background to the contemporary call on the 
part of Smith and Hick for a global theology of religions which 
is based on the recognition of unitive pluralism.
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2, TILLICH, JUNG AND TOYNBEE: I DEIFICATION OF THE C O M  
OORB OP ALL RELIGIONS
If mutual dialogue between the differing religions is to take 
place on the basis of what is common to them all, then this 
commonality needs to be clearly defined. What follows is an 
outline of three different definitions of such a common essence, 
Tillich, identified this common essence as "ultimate concern", 
jung, held that it lay in the human psyche. Toynbee, was of the 
opinion that it was to be found beyond what he termed the 
"nonessentials" of religious beliefs.
Although each of the above scholars viewed the unity of mankind's
religious history from their respective perspectives of 
systematic theology, psychology and history, they were all 
involved in the guest for wider interreligious dialogue on the 
basis of the essential sameness of all religious beliefs. Their 
common contribution to the study of religion lies in their 
identification and definition of a common core which forms the 
basis of all religions. By doing so they provided a theoretical 
basis according to which meaningful interfaith dialogue could be
feasibly pursued.
2.1 PAUL TILLICH: ALL PARTAKE IN ULTIMATE CONCERN
The key to Tillich's views on interreligious dialogue lies in 
his definition of the concept: 'religion'. Tillich (1963:4)
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defines this phenomenon as: "the state of being grasped by an 
ultimate concern, a concern which qualifies all other concerns as 
preliminary and which itself contains the answer to the question 
of the meaning of our life." Tillich further points out that the 
predominant religious name for the content of such an ultimate 
concern is God - a god or gods. Such a definition of religion, 
therefore, includes-, both theistic as well as non-theistic faiths 
and suggests a unity that underlies them all, namely, ulitimate 
concern.
Tillich emphasised that whilst religious beliefs should be 
regarded as the medium through which one many reach the Ultimate, 
they should not see themselves as being the Ultimate. He argues 
(1958:44) that religions, because they belong to the realm of 
finite reality, cannot claim ultimacy. The true ultimate 
transcends this realm infinitely and as such, "no finite reality 
can' express it directly and properly". Elsewhere (1953:97) he 
states that: "truth is relative to a group, to a concrete
situation, or to an existential predicament."
Tillich (1953:240) points out that demonic consequences follow 
the consecration of finite concerns to the status of ultimacy. 
He contends that "this happens continually in the actual life of 
most religions. The representation of man's ultimate concern - 
holy objects - tend to become his ultimate concern. They are 
transformed into idols. Holiness provokes idolatry.
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Tillich (1953:16) explains this idolatry as being "the elevation 
of a preliminary concern to ultimacy. Something essentially 
conditioned is taken as unconditional, something essentially 
partial is boosted into universality, and something essentially 
finite is given infinite significance (the best example is the 
contemporary example of religious nationalism)
Finite concerns, according to Tillich (1953:169) are always made 
ultimate at the expense of other, legitimate finite concerns. 
"To decide for something as true or as good means excluding 
countless other possibilities, ... many of which might have been 
better and truer than the chosen one." For this reason, Tillich 
stressed that religious beliefs should direct ultimate concern 
beyond themselves to that which is ultimate; to God.
In order that the various religious beliefs might achieve this
ideal, they give concrete content to ultimate concern by means of
symbolic language. Tillich (1958:44) states this point thus:
"Whatever we say about that which concerns us ultimately, whether
or not we call it God, has a symbolic meaning. It points beyond
itself while participating in that to which it points. In no
other way can faith express itself adequately. The language of
*
faith is the language of symbols."
*ln this regard see also: Tillich, P. Systematic Theology. 
Herts: James Nisbet and Co. Ltd. vol. 1.(1953), p.123;and
vol.2.(1957), p.10 and p.265. See also: Kimball,R. ed. 
(1964). Theology of culture. New York: Oxford University 
press, chapter five.
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Although the different faiths use symbols to express the 
Ultimate, Tillich (1966:81) emphasises that "revelatory 
experiences are universally human. Religions are based on 
something that is given to man wherever he lives. He is given a 
revelation which always implies saving powers." Tillich 
therefore recognises the validity of all religious beliefs.
Tillich was of the opinion that these differing beliefs would be 
able to realise their common concern with the Ultimate through 
dialogue with each othe-. Commenting on this call for 
interfaith dialogue, Green (1973:422) states that "the primary 
purpose of this dialogue is to penetrate to the depths of their 
own respective visions of the divine so that they become more 
transparent to the infinite and unconditional reality which 
transcends and is present in them."
Such a dialogue, Tillich (1963:62) argues, should take place 
according to the following ground-rules:-
"It first presupposes that both partners acknowledge the value of 
the other's religious conviction (as based ultimately on 
revelatory experience), so that they consider the dialogue 
worthwhile. Second it presupposes that each of them is able to 
represent his own religious basis with conviction, so that the 
dialogue is a serious confrontation. Third, it presupposes 
common ground which makes both dialogue and conflicts possible, 
and, fourth, the openness of both sides to criticisms directed
against theit own religious basis."
Having established the rules, Tillich (1963:58 - 59) then 
suggests the method by which dialogue should proceed. He 
proposes a method based upon a typology of religions which he 
organises by means of the different elements that are intrinsic 
to the nature of the Holy, namely, the sacramental, the mystic, 
and the ethical. These three elements, he holds, are present in 
each religion, and since each religious belief highlights a 
different element of the Holy, it is necessary for them to enter 
into a dynamic relationship with each other.
The result of interfaith dialogue, according to Tillich
(1966:88), would not be a synthesis of all religious beliefs into 
**
one world religion. He does, however, point out that such a 
synthesis, should it ever occur, could only be regarded as a 
future possibility. At present, it could not be fully identified 
with any of the current religious beliefs. In this regard it can 
perhaps be argued that Tillich hinted at an ultimate 
eschatological solution to the problem of the conflicting truth- 
claims.
*An example of the typological dialogic method is given in 
Tillich, P. (1963). Christianity and the Encounter of the 
World Religions. New York: Columbia University Press.
Chapter entitled: "A Christian - Buddhist Conversation .
**Tillich terms such a religion: "The Religion of the Concrete 
Spirit".
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However, his main contribution to the problem of religious 
pluralism is that, by identifying a common core of religious 
belief in "ultimate concern", he at least made it theoretically 
possible for people of differing faiths to look beyond the 
confines of their particular symbolic language and enter into 
mutual dialogue with one another on the basis of their common 
essence.
2.2 CARL GUSTAV JUNG: A COMMON BASIS IN THE HUMAN PSYCHE
Jung argued that the common essence of all religions was to be 
found in the human psyche. His studies in psychology led him to 
postulate that the realm of the unconscious could be entered by 
means of "archetypes" which he defined as being: "the hidden
foundations of the conscious mind" (Jung, 1970:31).
Jung described the general contents of the archetypes as being 
concerned with concepts such as light and darkness, death and 
rebirth, wholeness, sacrifice and redemption. He thus concluded 
(1938:63) that the archetypes were the common seedbed of all 
religions. He further postulated the means by which archetypes 
are able to be decoded by man. In this regard his thought is 
strikingly similar to that of Tillich in that this decoding is 
done through the concepts of 1 symbol' and 'myths' through which, 
according to Jung, we are put into contact with our unconscious
The archetypes were common to all religions, yet, the symbols and 
myths of each were obviously different in form as these were 
dependent on the varying cultural and historical contexts of each 
faith. Jung explained the common archetypes and similar symbol 
patterns within the diverse cultures as being due to a 
fundamental, hidden unity that animates all humanity. This unity 
he termed the "collective unconscious", a phenomenon which in 
some way contained: "the whole spiritual heritage of mankind's 
evolution, born anew in the brain structure of every individual" 
(Jung, 1953a:158).
One of the archetypes, which he termed the "Self", (which 
represents the process by which the ego systematically confronts 
the contents of the unconscious, namely, "individuation"), is of 
particular importance to his theory of the common essence of all 
religious beliefs. This is so because he was unable to 
distinguish between this archetype and the characteristics that 
religious persons and theologians have given to the reality which 
they term: 'God'. Thus, Jung concluded that the human being is 
"an entity endowed with the consciousness of relationship to 
Deity" and that belief in God, therefore, seems to be a 
psychological necessity. Without it, the Self would not be 
realised (Jung, 1953b:10 - 11).
Jung's classic statement in support of the above view reads as 
follows:
"Among all my patients in the second half of life ... there has
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not been one whose problem in the last resort was not that of
finding a religious outlook on life. It is safe to say that
every one of them fell ill because he had lost that which the
living religions of every age had given to their followers, and
none of them has really been healed who did not regain his 
*
religious outlook."
This statement is not closely tied to any particular religious 
belief. It has to do with the vital role played by religion in 
mediating between the "divine content" of the unconscious and a 
person's conscious awareness. "So Jung could call the world 
religions the great psychotherapeutic symbol systems of the 
world; they provide the symbols by which the archetypes can be 
touched and called forth" (Knitter, 1985:60).
Notwithstanding this psychological fact, Jung stressed that an 
absolute religion is an inconceivable concept as no definite 
figure is capable of expressing archetypal indefiniteness 
(1953b:18). The image of God (and, therefore, the Self) remains 
an utter mystery to us and can never be fully captured in any one 
form. Therefore, according to Jung, religious pluralism must 
continue to exist in that a final, absolute religion would mean 
that the vital process of individualisation would be brought to 
an end.
*This quotation is taken from Bechtle, R. (1973). "C.G.Junq 
and Religion." In: Heaney, J.J. ed. Psyche and Spirit. New 
York: Paulist, p.69. The bibliographical details of the
original reference are not cited.
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Thus, unlike Tillich, Jung does not hint at any future 
possibility of one world religion as an ultimate solution to 
differing truth-claims. He rather proposes an interreligious 
dialogue which, despite the existence of differing individual 
faiths, is theoretically possible because of the common psychic 
essence of all religious beliefs. Jung pointed out that through 
such dialogue, the East, which has "long been aware of the 
reality of the unconscious and the necessity of penetrating its 
depths" could provide the West "with the challenge and the means 
of discovering the divine within us" (1964:26).
Jung, however, cautioned Westerners against conversion to Eastern 
faiths as he believed that man is limited by his particular 
cultural experiences. He thus stressed that dialogue between 
East and West, rather than lead to conversion to any side, should 
balance and enrich the participants through r. paradoxical unity 
of opposites.
In terms of the theoretical feasibility of an interfaith 
dialogue, despite conflicting truch-claims, Jung, like Tillich, 
identified a common core from which such mutual interaction could 
take place. Furthermore he saw the continued existence of 
religious pluralism au a necessity in View of the fact that man, 
who is a definite being, will never fully grasp the mystery of 
God, who is an indefinite being, In particular, man as definite 
being is limited by the particular cultural and historical 
context in which he finds himself. As such, therefore, religious
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in terms of the theoretical feasibility of an interfaith 
dialogue, despite conflicting truth-claims, Jung, like Tillich, 
identified a common core from which such mutual interaction could 
take place. Furthermore he saw the continued existence of 
religious pluralism as a necessity in view of the fact that man, 
who is a definite being, will never fully grasp the mystery of 
God, who is an indefinite being. In particular, man as definite 
being is limited by the particular cultural and historical 
context in which he finds himself. As such, therefore, religious
beliefs cannot be synthesised into a uniform entity. Yet, given 
that all religions have their common core in the human psyche, 
Jung paved the way for the possibility of a unitive pluralism of 
religions.
2.3 ARNOLD TOYNBEE: COMMON ESSENCE; COMMON PURPOSE
Toynbee (1956:262) held that the different religions of the world 
had their common essence in that which lies behind what he terms 
as the "nonessentials" of the particular manifestations of faith. 
These nonessentials consist of the entire complex of Creed 
(symbols, doctrines, theology), Code (ethical systems), and Cult 
(ritual, liturgy), through which the different faiths try to 
communicate their respective messages (Knitter, 1935:39).
Commenting on the above institutions, Toynbee (1956:266) states 
that "one generic evil of an institution of any kind is that 
people who have identified themselves with it are prone to make 
an idol of it." when this happens, Toynbee argues that man then 
forgets the true purpose of religion, namely, to make mar. aware 
of the spiritual presence that lies within all reality. This 
spiritual presence, according to Toynbee, was present in all the 
major religions of the world. Therein lay their common essence. 
In this regard his similarity to Tillichian thought is self- 
evident.
Toynbee (1969:159) is, again, similar to Tillich when he urges
religious beliefs to ever reconsider their nonessentials in order 
that they be able to continue to speak to a people implanted in 
an always changing history. Tillich had caULed for the need to
supersede symbolic religious language and enter into dialogue 
with a view to realising the ultimate reality that lies at the 
basis of all religion. On this issue, he is linked with 
Toynbee's call for a reconsideration of nonessentials. However, 
Toynbee goes beyond Tillich by introducing a further purpose of 
such a venture. Not only does he believe that it will assist 
religions to recognise this common core, but it will also help 
them to cope with the state of flux in which history constantly
finds itself.
Kcause o£ this state ot Ilu* in history, Toynbee envisioned a 
time when all religions would be intermingled with each other 
thronghout tne world. Their different cultural heritages would 
thus become the come, possession of all mankind. Thus he 
believed that differing religions would learn from and change 
each other (Toynbee, 1966,8.'). In this regard, Toynbee’s 
thought is similar to that of Jang.
According to Toynbee, the intermingling of different religious 
ideas would only result should they all pursue what he regarded 
as their common purpose. Be defined this common purpose (1956,2
SKFFfearaS&aSS
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- 3) as the overcoming of the selfishness that results from what
he termed; "man worship" - that ; t .2 worship of collective 
*
human power. This phenomenon inflicts much devastation on the 
world and leads to evil.
To offset such havoc, Toynbee argues that humans realise or 
rather, they believe that they must recognise and be in harmony 
with some greater reality. Thus the various religions were born. 
These differ in outlook because of their respective historical 
circumstances, but, because of their common essence and purpose, 
Toynbee (1969:159) suggests that they "ought to subordinate their 
traditional rivalries and make a new approach towards one another 
in the face of a fearful common adversary: a revival of the 
worship of collective human power, armed with new weapons, both 
material and spiritual."
Such an approach could be one of plurali .1 as he believed, on the 
basis of his common essence: common purpose theory, that one 
could be fully committed to one's own faith without allowing -he 
nonessentials to blind one from thn truth of others. Should a 
particular religion hold onto its nonessentials as superior or 
absolute however, the result would be a further persistence of 
self-centredness which will have lost sight of the essential 
oneness of all rel:aions.
*For a full explanation of this concept see: Toynbee, A. 
(1956). A Historians Approach to Religion. London: Oxford 
University Press, pp.,263 - 266.
Toynbee's contribution to the theoretical basis of interfaith 
dialogue is thus twofold. Firstly, like Tillich and Jung, he 
identified a common core that lies behind the differing faiths. 
Secondly, as a historian, he foresaw the global village of 
mankind when the differing faiths would have much closer contact 
with each other than was the case in the past. Such a time would 
necessitate a reinterpretation of the nonessentials of each faith 
in order that religion might keep up with the flux of history.
3. CURRENT PROPONENTS OF THE COMMON ESSENCE VIEWPOINT:
WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH AND JOHN SUCK
With regard to the call for religions to enter into dialogue
with each other on the basis of a unitive pluralism, this has
been met through conferences and seminars and through the
establishment of numerous interfaith organisations throughout 
*
the world. It appears therefore that the idea of meaningful 
encounter between religious beliefs on the basis of their common 
essence has come of age.
Nevertheless, such dialogue and encounter has not solved the 
problem of conflicting truth-claims. If anything, it has served 
to accentuate the differences that exist between religions. This 
problem has led many to pursue the quest of arriving at a new
*For a survey of interfaith dialogue since 1893, see; 
Braybrooke, M. (1980). Inter-faith Organisations 1893 - 
1979; An historical directory. New York: Edwin Mellen
Press.
global theology of religions which was not fully worked out by 
the three models discussed above in that they did not show how 
the differing faiths should actually reinterpret their differing 
symbols in order to deal with religious pluralism.
Two prominent proponents of a theory of global theology are 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith and John Hick. In working out their 
respective theories, they were able to draw on the ideas of the 
"common essence" school. Using the theory of unitive pluralism 
as their basis, both Smith and Hick attempted to indicate the 
feasibility of a global theology of religions on the basis of the 
radical reinterpretation of traditional religious language.
3.1 WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH; FAITH AS PARTICIPATION IN 
TRANSCENDENCE
3.1.1 THE FUNDAMENTALS OF SMITH'S PHILOSOPHY
Smith was confronted head-on by the problem of the conflicting 
truth-claims during his time as a teacher at Forman Christian 
College (1941 - 1945) in Lahore, India. Despite the fact that 
the college existed under the banner of Christianity, many of the 
teachers and pupils were of the Hindu and Muslim faiths. 
Nevertheless, these three differing beliefs somehow coexisted 
peacefully, not only in a spirit of toleration, but also of 
mutual respect. This situation of religious diversity was 
typical of the city and of India at cge. In reflecting on this
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situation and applying it on a broader scale to the religious 
life of the whole of mankind, Smith mapped out his solution to 
the issue of the conflicting truth-claims.
The central thought that was to govern all Smith's subsequent 
research in the field of comparative religion was that if the 
religious life of mankind is to be lived at all in the future, it 
can only be lived in a context of religious pluralism (Smith, 
1962a;9). Smith (1962a;11) further pointed out that he did not 
foresee that there would be many conversions from the one 
religious tradition to the other within the next hundred years. 
He did, however, foresee that there would be "increasing 
encounters among the varying traditions and subsequent ferment 
within each group." As far as both of the above thoughts are 
concerned, the similarities to the Jungian model, outlined above, 
are self evident.
Smith (1962a;13) defines the religious problem for modern man as 
follows ; "The problem is for us all to live together with our 
seriously different traditions, not only in peace, but in some 
sort of mutual trust and mutual loyalty....which means also to 
arrive at a point where we can appreciate other men's values 
without losing allegiance to our own." In another work 
(1962b;10 - 11) he sees religious coexistence as being at least 
"an immediate necessity and indeed an immediate virtue."
He is so strongly disposed towards the creation of a world in
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i religious coexistence would become a reality that he calls 
a rejection of the term: 1 religion',and argues that it is a 
jrn concept that does not do justice to the phenomenon that 
is supposed to describe. Use of the term has made this 
Dmenon into a thing wheras in fact it is "a quality of 
Dnal living" (1967:115). He proposes, therefore, that 
jious life should be understood in terms of a process in
1 persons of faith participate rather than in terms of a 
Eied" and packaged entity (1981:23).
, according to Smith (1967:123), "religious life begins 
the fact of God; a fact that includes His existence, His 
y, His love for all of us without exception, without 
rimination, without favour, without reminder. Given that 
- and it is given; absolutely, and quite independently of 
ier or how we human beings recognise it; given that 
movable fact, religious life then consists in the quality of 
response." Titles for the various religions do not bring 
point to the fore and thus have become inadequate in our 
rn age. They fail to do justice to the true meaning of man's 
giotis life, namely, his involvement and faith in 
scendence (Smith, 1962b:201).
2 THE ROLE OF COMPARATIVE RELIGION IN THE REALISATION 
OF THE "BROTHERHOOD OF MAN"
t (1962a:15) points out that with the introduction of
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departments of comparative religion at universities throughout 
the world, students from differing religious backgrounds have 
been given an opportunity of learning aboUu the faith of other 
men. This has been an important step towards the realisation of 
the problem posed by religious pluralism and of the need to come 
to terms with it. This problem, he argues, "is at least as 
important for manxind as that of nuclear physics; as 
intellectually challenging, as intricate, as exciting, as 
consequential". However, Smith (1962a:17) is quick to caution 
us that the mere acquisition of knowledge about the various 
faiths does not solve the religious problem. One may know a 
great deal about a particular religious system and yet fail to 
understand the people whose life it involves. He thus firmly 
believes that courses in comparative religion should not 
primarily promote the acquisition of knowledge about the various 
* beliefs.
According to Smith (1950:42) those scholars who have adopted such 
a "handbook approach" to the study of world religions "might 
uncharitably be compared to flies crawling on the outside of a 
goldfish bowl, making accurate and complete observations on the
*Smith expresses these same sentiments in other works. See: 
Smith, W.C. (1950). "The Comparative Study of Religion: 
Reflections on the Possibility and the Purpose of Religious 
Science." In: Me Gill University, Faculty of
Divinity,Inaugural Lectures. Montreal: Me Gill University 
Press, p.51. See also: Smith, W.C. (1973), "comparative 
Religion : Whither and Why?" In: Eliade, M. and Kitagawa, 
J.M. eds. The History of Religions; Essays in Methodology. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, p.34.
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tfish inside ... and indeed contributing much to our knowledge of
the subject; but never asking themselves, and never finding out,
*
how it feels to be a goldfish." This is a very real problem. 
No matter how much we may empathise, we are always outsiders to 
any religion but our own. Thus, Smith suggests that comparative 
religion should rather be presented in such a way that students 
are led to see the world, or at least some aspect of it, through 
the eyes of a member of another faith.
Only when this is done, Smith (1962a:16) argues, will the 
believer of one faith have any hope of being able to understand 
the believer of another. Comparative religion has the potential 
to make this possible, however precarious and difficult the task ' 
may seem to be.
Once the student of comparative religion has attempted to 
understand the faith of the other individual the next step, 
according to Smith (1962a:20), will be "the attempt to understand 
the fact of faith itseL.." In the light of the history of faith,
*Thus, for example, he contends that: "We understand the
faith of Hindus only when, like them, we can use the 
religious tradition of Hindus to enable us to see all of 
life, from medicine to nuclear weapons, from economic 
development to the disloyalty of a friend, through Hindu
eyes." See: Smith, W.C. (1964). "Mankind's Religiously
Divided History Approaches Self-Consciousness," In: Harvard 
Divinity Bulletin, 29. See also: Smith, W.C. (1957).
Islam in Modern History. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, p.8; where he asserts that: "To know ... any
religion, is not only to be apprised of, even carefully 
acquainted with, its institutions, patterns and his to’-y, but 
also to apprehend what these mean to those who have the 
faith."
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Smith argues that the student must atteirpt "to understand it as a 
well-nigh universal phenomenon, immensely diversified in 
particular, remarkably persistent in general"
Smith (1962a:82) asks whether one can make any sense out of the 
bewildering panorama of facts that emerge out of comparative 
religious studies. He believes that to ask about other men's 
faiths is in itself to raise important issues about one's own. 
To illustrate this point he examines three levels at which the 
faith of other men has implications for one's own and vice versa. 
These are: the levels of personal experience; theological
doctrine; and moral interrelation. The examples used apply to
the Christian believer, yet can be translated in terms of
encounters between comparative religion students of all faiths.
3.1.2a THE LEVEL OP PERSONAL EXPERIENCE
The Christian who encounters Islam, for example, will soon 
realise from his research experience, that the two faiths refer 
to many concepts that are similar. This realisation brings the 
two religions together. However, despite this similarity, the 
second step is for the Christian to discover that the Muslim 
talks and thinks about these concepts in a different way. Such a 
step moves the two religions apart. However, a third step 
involves the realisation by both parties (on the basis of
comparative religious studies) that God is greater than our own
ideas of Him. This may or may not bring them together again. It
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depends on both parties and especially on what kind of Christian 
one is and on what one does about it.
3.1.2b THE LEVEL OF THEOLOGICAL DOCTRINE
In the field of theology, the Christian has been brought up to 
believe that other men's faiths are false. Thus, if the 
Christian comparative religionist takes this theological current 
seriously, "then he comes to the task prejudiced, in the literal 
sense of having made up his mind before he begins his study as to 
what he is going to find. Sometimes he has made it up very 
firmly indeed, even to the disastrous point of feeling his own 
faith threatened if he finds other men's faith more valid and 
real and true and deeper than the theologians had told him it 
would be" (Smith, 1962a:91).
Therefore Smith reminds us that theology and faith are not 
synonymous terms. The two should not be confused. He defines 
theology as "the attempt on the part of the theologian, who is 
quite human, to give an intellectual statement for his faith 
(1962a:91). Seen in this light, the Christian student of 
comparative religion is able to realise that his theology in the 
field of relations with other men, is not adequate for today's 
world.
Furthermore, Smith (1962a:92) predicts that the time will come 
when a truer Christian theology pertaining to the faith of other
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men will be worked out. Such a theology, he argues, must be 
guided by the principle that if the Christian revelation is at 
all valid, then it follows that the faith of others is also
genuine.
3.1.2c THE LEVEL OF MORAL INTERRELATION
Personally, Smith sees the clear moral imperative with the 
Christian as providing the basis for the revised theological 
position advanced above. Morally, the Christian Imperative is 
towards brotherhood, concord, reconciliation and love. Christian 
theological doctrines have, however, served to create "a great 
cosmic gulf" between Christians and believers of other faiths and 
as such have served to prevent the realisation of brotherhood. 
For example, Christian theological doctrines have led to crimes 
such as anti-Semitism, apartheid and colonialism - a far cry from 
the moral imperative!
The moral level of interrelation with other faiths, according to 
Smith, involves that the Christian; a) should not be 
unsympathetic towards the faith of others and b) should "strive 
to construct a world of reconciliation and peace, of mutual 
understanding and global community, of universal human dignity"
(1962a:95).
The three levels at which the faith of other men has implications 
for one's own faith, nuke it clear that comparative religion can
do far more than promote mere knowledge of the various beliefs. 
Smith believes that the comparative religionist has a legitimate 
and serious task of formulating ideas that attempt to do justice 
to both the profundity and the diversity of mankind's religious 
system, in the hope of constructing theories that would prove 
acceptable as well as being cogent within the academic tradition. 
He therefore urges more people to take up this task.
3.1.3 A WORLD THEOLOGY?
In his conclusion to: The Faith of Other Men, Smith (1962a:110) 
expressed his conviction that this proposed, variegated and yet 
harmonious world community was theoretically possible. His 3981 
book: Towards a World Theology, pursues this conviction and 
offers a detailed comparative religionist perspective as to why a 
world theology is possible.
in a similar vein to the common essence viewpoint, Smith 
(1981:3), argues that there is a unity or coherence in the 
religious history of mankind which at one level is a historical 
fact and at another is a matter of theological truth. As far as 
the former level is concerned, Smith points out that, 
historically, religions can be shown to be part of a coherent 
unity. The differences between them are due to the state of flux 
of history, yet the unity can be historically traced.
Not only can the unity of mankind's religious history be shown on
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a historical level, but it can also be shown to exist on a 
theological one. Behind the differing faiths lies a unity in the 
transcendent; God. Smith contends that once man realises the 
fact that his religious history forms a unity on both these 
levels and that the two are inextricably linked, then a 
"brotherhood of man" becomes possible.
3.1.3a THE HISTOR JAL UNITY OF MANKIND'S RELIGIOUS HISTORY
In a similar vein to Toynbee, Smith points out that, like
history, the religious life of man is in a state of flux.
Buddhism grew out of Hinduism. Christianity and Islam grew out
of Judaism. The new constantly shows itself to have built onto
the old. This is not only true of the major religions themselves
but also of the diversity that exists within them. A new sect
breaks away from an old one and builds onto it as for example was
done with Protestantism developing as a result of dissatisfaction 
*
with Catholicism.
in terms of the above, Smith (1981:23) concludes that religious 
life should rather be understood in terms of a process in which 
persons of faith participate and not in terms of a particular 
religious system. He further points out that man has now reached 
a point in time at which he is becoming conscious of the fact
*For the full exposition of this thesis see: Smith, W.C.
(1981). Towards a world Theology: Faith and the Comparative 
History of Religion. London: Macmillan, pp.7 -23,
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that the various religious processes have participated in each 
other's development. This consciousness, he argues, opens the 
door towards the realisation that despite our diversity, we are 
all involved in the world process of religious convergence. "For 
ultimately, the only community there is, is the community, world­
wide and history-long, of humankind" (Smith, 1981:44).
Having made this point, Smith then links it to his earlier views 
on the value of comparative religion in the realisation of a 
brotherhood of man. He holds that the locus of faith is not 
data, but persons. The secular aspect of man's life cannot be 
divorced from the religious as to be fully human involves both 
these aspects. Thus, the history of religion is the history of 
man. Through this discipline it becomes possible to understand 
the faith of the other men and to realise that, despite 
differences in perspective, we are one humankind participating in 
the religious process (Smith, 1901:50 - 51).
At the outset of this work, Smith cautions us not to 
misunderstand his thesis to mean that all religions ate the same. 
This is clearly not the case. They are however, "historically 
interconnected in that they have interacted with the same things 
or with each other, or that one has 'grown out of or been 
'influenced by' the other; more exactly, that one can be
■'See also: Smith, W.C. (1976). "Participation: The changing 
Christian Role in Other Cultures," In: Oxtoby, W.G. ed. 
Religious Diversity: Essays by Wilfred Cantwell Smith. New 
York: Harper and Row, p.136,
z-
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understood only in terms of a context of which the other forms a 
part" (Smith, 1901:5 - 6). The several histories of the 
different religious communities on earth can be better understood 
and in the end can be understood only in terms of each other: "as 
strands in a still more complex whole."
3,1.3b THE THEOLOGICAL UNITY OF MANKIND'S RELIGIOUS 
HISTORY
Because of the above argument that our different religious 
processes are all part of a total complex, Smith contends that 
there is, therefore, also a theological unity which underlies our 
diverse religious processes.
This point was emphasised by Smith in one of his earlier works 
(1962b). There he pointed out that the end (i.e. the goal) of 
religion is God. "Once He appears vividly before us, in His 
depth and love and unrelenting truth all else dissolves; or at 
least religious paraphenalia drop back into their due and mundane 
place, and the concept 'religion' is brought to an end"
(1962b:201).
Smith (1981:3) is convinced, through his historical studies, that 
history, because it is human, " has transcendent overtones." The 
sane studies have also convinced him that truth, including 
ultimate truth (i.e. God), manifests itself in history. 
Consequently, because comparative religious studies have enabled
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However, Smith (1981:4) points out that empirical awareness of 
God vividly indicates the diversity of forms in which He makes 
himself known to mankind. Consequently Smith is of the opinion 
that through comparative religious studies, man will be able to 
recognise the truth that despite divergent religious beliefs 
there is a unity (God) in the religious history of mankind. 
Given this as a fundamental premise, it becomes possible to work 
towards the realisation of a 'world theology1 of religions.
Smith does not dictate to us what this new theology should 
entail. Instead he calls upon us al) to contribute towards a 
more adequate theology of religions which takes each religious 
position seriously and strives to make sense of the fact of 
religious pluralism in the modern world. This task of building 
on earth a new world community will not be an easy one. Its 
results will be radical. Yet the task will remain an 
impossibility unless each of us brings to it the resources of his 
or her mind, and his or her faith (1981:129 - 130).
3.1,4 SMITH'S CONTRIBUTION TO INTERFAITH DIALOGUE
Smith's call for interreligious dialogue on the basis of unitive 
pluralism is not unique. Nevertheless, he offers some new 
insights towards its ultimate realisation.
His main contribution in this regard is his contention that the 
study of religion involves not so much the examination of
60
religious systems but rather that of persons. He reminds us, 
therefore, that one will never fully know a particular religious 
system unless one enters into an encounter with people who adhere 
to such a system. Through comparative religious studies whereby 
one examines the beliefs and practices of differing people, Smith 
believed, we will attain a vaster insight into the nature and 
character of God.
Smith is also well known for his rejection of the term: 
•religion’, and titles that attempt to classify particular 
religious traditions. By so doing he does not attempt to deny 
that religious practices are different, but, he wishes to show
that such titles do not take into consideration that 
the phenomena and systems that they attempt to describe are, like 
history, in a state of constant flu.x.
He encourages us, therefore, to take cognisance of this fact. 
Indeed, he goes so far as to demonstrate this state of flux. 
Toynbee had pointed us in this direction. Smith's historical 
studies, however, show the point at which the flux has now 
arrived, namely, that of interreligious convergence.
In order for mankind to be able to cope with interreligious 
convergence, Smith stresses that we need to realise that our
differing traditions that have now come together in a global
community, have always been historically intertwined. For this
reason, therefore, he believes that a global theology of
religions that is needed to cope with this new phase of history, 
can be realised.
3.2 JOHN HICK: GOD HAS MANY NAMES
Hick is perhaps the best known of the exponents of a unitive 
pluralism of religions. The basis of his thesis is a call for 
all religions to recognise that the one God is perceived by 
mankind in a plurality of ways. He argues that it is through 
such a recognition that it then becomes possible for 
all faiths to be recognised as vehicles of His revelation.
He suggests that wider interreligious encounter could lead to 
something more exciting and far reaching than mere coexistence. 
It could lead to "an important religious discovery in which we 
(Christians) and they (adherents of other faiths) both learn more 
of the many-sided being and activity of God" (Hick, 1980a: vii).
Underlying this statenent is the recognition that a global 
theology of religions is possible. Once man realises that his 
particular belief is but one of many diverse ways of revering the 
one God of all mankind, then religious barriers, despite their 
continued existence, fall away. God, therefore, forms the common
*This thesis is fully expounded in the following works; Hick, 
j (1973). God and the Universe of Faiths. New York: St.
Martin's Press; Hick, J. ed. (1977). The Myth of ^od 
Incarnate. London: SCM Press; and Hick, J. (1980). God Has 
Many Names. London: Macmillan Ltd.
♦^Brackets are my own.
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essence of all religions. Hick arrives at the above conclusion by
*
means of his theory of the "Copernican Revolution" of religion.
3.2.1 THE "COPERNICAN REVOLUTION" THEORY OF RELIGION
Using the analogy of Copernicus, namely, that the sun and not the 
earth was the centre of our solar system, Hick (1983:81 - 82) 
argues that "it seems to many of us today that we need a 
Copernican revolution in our understanding of religions."
Hick (1983:82) clarifies this statement from within his own
Christian perspective. The pre-Copernican view of religion 
therefore is "the traditional dogma that Christianity is the 
centre of the universe of faiths, with all the other religions 
seen as revolving at various removes around the revelation in 
Christ and being graded according to their nearness to or
distance from it." The Copernican view, however, involves "a 
paradigm shift from a Christianity-centred or Jesus-centred to a 
God-centred model of the universe of faiths. One then sees the 
great world religions as different human responses to the one
divine Reality, embodying different perceptions which have been
formed in different historical and cultural circumstances" (Hick,
*Hick outlines this theory in several works. See* Hick, God 
and the Universe of Faiths, p. 131; Hick, God Has Many 
Names, pp. 5 - 6; and Hick, J. (1983). The Second 
Christianity. London: SCM Press, pp.81 -82. The last work 
cited above is a reprint of two earlier editions which were 
published under different titles. See: Hick, J. (1968). 
Christianity at the Centre. London: SCM Press; and Hick, J. 
(1977). The Centre of Christianity. London: SCM Press.
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1973b:131).
Commenting on the implications of the above theory for world 
religions, Hick (1980a:52) states that "this must mean that the 
different world religions have each served as God's means of 
revelation to and point of contact with a different stream of 
human life." Such a theory, for Hick, is a logical one in that 
it ties in with our knowledge of the history of religions.
The first period of this history was characterised by different
forms of natural religion. But, around 800 B.C. there began what
*
Hick terms an "axial period" in which God somehow revealed 
himself to different peoples of different religious traits who at 
that stage lived in isolation from each other. Because of this 
Hick (1980a:53) argues, "there could not be a divine revelation, 
through any human means to mankind as a whole, but only separate 
revelations within the different streams of human history."
Today, however, these religions have been propelled into the 
'global village' where contact with each other is a frequent
*Here Hick follows the notion of an 'axial period' of 
humankind which was propounded by Karl Jaspers. See: 
Jaspers, K. (1953). The Origin and Goal of History. 
London: Haitiedge and Kegan Paul. See also: Hick, God and
the Universe of Faiths, pp. 135 - 136; Hick, God Has Many
Names, pp. 51 - 53; Hick, The Second Christianity, pp. 8 - 
9; Hick, J. ed„ (1974). Truth and Dialogue in World
Religions: conflicting Truth Claims. Philadelphia:
Westminster, pp. 149 -151; and Hick, J. and Hebblethwaite, 
B. eds. (1980). Christianity and Other Religions.
Philadelphia: Fortress, pp. 182 -183.
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occurrence. "The scientific study of world religions, inter-
faith dialogues and conferences, the experience of religious
pluralism in many large cities, have brought us all closer to men
of other faiths. The religions of the world have begun to share
*
their insights" (Hick, 1983:89).
Thus, if God lies at the centre of all the different faiths, then 
the possibility of a global theology that is designed to 
interpret the religious experience of mankind as it occurs within 
the great streams of religious life, is a highly feasible one. 
Hick, like Smith, points out that this task would be a 
Vast project that would require the co-operative labours of many 
individuals and groups. It will involve increasing comparative 
and constructive studies of both particular areas and larger 
systems of belief, which, in the end, will reveal "a common human 
history and a common human relationship to the mysterious 
transcendent reality which we in the West call God" (1980a:8 - 
9),
Thus far, Hick has not been unique in his thought. Most of the 
elements of his thesis have already occurred in the models tha: 
were discussed above. What sets Hick apart from them, however, 
is his attempt, as a Christian, at a re interpretation of the 
central symbol of his faith, namely, the doctrine of the 
incarnation.
*Note the similarity to Smith.
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3,2.2 THE MYTH OF GOD INCARNATE
The Christian doctrine of the Incarnation whereby Jesus, the man 
of Nazareth, is exalted to the status of the divine Christ, 
provides a major stumbling-block to the realisation of a global 
theology of religions. Hick therefore presents a 
reinterpretation of this central symbol of the Christian faith 
so as to remove the implication that man's salvation is 
only possible through this belief.
Hick argues that the dogma of the Incarnation should be 
understood as a myth and, therefore, should not be interpreted 
literally. The rationale behind this view is that the doctrine 
does not form part of the original message of Jesus as recountei 
by the writers of the Synoptics. The church based the doctrine 
on the fourth gospel which modern critical scholarship has shown 
to be a re-writing of Jesus' teaching by "a Christian, writer who 
is expressing the view of Christ which had been arrived at in his 
part of the church, probably two or three generations after 
Jesus' death" (1977a:176).
Thus, according to Hick (1977a:170), the doctrine rather 
represents a symbolic-mythic model which was used by the early
*This theory is expounded by Hick in several works. See; 
Hick, God and the Universe of Faiths, pp. 14B - 149; Hick, 
The Myth of God Incarnate, pp. 167 - 185; Hick, God has Many. 
SeiTTpT'SST-" 79; ahdlfick, The Second Christianity, pp.26 
- H T  As these sections are repetitions of the same essay, 
I will cite largely from: Hick, The Myth of God incarnate.
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followers of Jesus in their atterrpt to describe what He meant to 
them.
Hick (1980a:60 - 61) compares the elevation of Jesus to divine 
status with that of Gautama, the Buddha. Here too, a real
historical figure "came to be revered as much more than an 
outstanding individual who had lived and died." In both cases it 
appears that this elevation of a human to divine status reflects 
the projection of ideals upon an individual to answer man's 
spiritual needs.
In the case of Christianity, the followers of Jesus developed the 
Jewish image of the 'son of God', a title tf at was often used for ' 
the expected Messiah, but could also be applied to any 
extraordinary religious person. The reason for this, Hick 
(19773:172) argues, was because Jesus was "so powerfully God­
conscious that his life vibrated, as it were, to the divine life; 
and as a result his hands could heal the sick, and the 'poor in 
spirit' were kindled to a new life in his presence." Thus Hick 
(1983:27) contends that "it was natural for Jesus to call men to 
become his disciples. And it was equally natural for them to 
follow him as their Lord and to preach his message to others. It 
was natural again that after his death and Easter appearances his 
disciples, filled with the spirit, should proclaim Jesus as Lord 
and Saviour to all who should respond to him."
Utet deiftcatio.1 ol Jesas tea-lted f e d  the influence of the 
Graeco-Roman thought world on Christian ideas (Hick, 1977a,168). 
Here the idea of the divihe being embodied in huton Ufa was 
widespread and so, in Hick’s opinion, a natural change in 
Christian attitude towards their expression of Jesus took place. 
•Jesus' specially intimate awareness of his consequent
spiritual authority and his efficacy as t o d  and as giver of new 
life, required in his disciples an adequate language in which to 
speak about their master. He had to be thought of in a way that 
was convnensurate with the total discipleship which he evoked. 
M d  so his Jewish followers hailed him as their Messiah, and this 
somewhat mysterious title developed in its significance within 
the nixed Jewish-centile church ultimately to the point of 
deification" (Hick, 1977a:173 - 174).
The important point to note here is not so much the fact that 
Jesus was deified, but, rather that the language used to express 
this deification belonged to the particular cultural milieu 
within which his followers found themselves. Hick therefore 
contends that had the Christian gospel moved East, into India 
instead of West, into the Roman Empire, .Jesus's religious 
significance would probably have been expressed by hailing him 
within Hindu culture as a divine Avatar and within Mahayana 
Buddhism ... as a Bodhisattva. ... These would have been 
appropriate expressions within those cultures, of the same 
spiritual reality" (Hick, 1977a:176).
M
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Concerning the argument that Jesus himself was conscious of being 
God-incarnate, Hick points out that such an assumption is based 
largely on the fourth gospel. It has already been noted above 
that such statements do not appear to be authentic statements of 
Jesus.
Hick (1977a:178) contends that although Orthodoxy endorsed the 
language of the Incarnation, it has never been able to give the 
idea any content. "It remains a form of words without assignable 
meaning. ... How ... the same person can have the full attributes 
of both God and man - has never been explained, and seems indeed 
to be on a par with the statement that a figure drawn on paper 
has the attributes of both a circle and a square." Thus today 
the question as to the meaning of the doctrine is being raised 
and its mythological intrepretation is being stressed by many.
The literal Interpretation of the doctrine excludes the large 
majority of the human race from salvation. The mythological 
understanding, however, makes allowance for the possibility that 
the 'agape' (Love) of God that the early Christians experienced 
can be seen as being but a finite mode of the expression of 
'agape' ger se which exceeds all historical boundaries (Hick, 
1973b: 159). Seen in this light, all religions can lie taken to be 
valid vehicles through which God manifests himself in history.
Hick doubts that the traditional language concerning Jesus will 
become obsolete. But he foresees " a growing awareness of the
mythological character of this language, as the hyperbole of the 
heart, most naturally at home in hymns and anthems and oratories 
and other artistic expressions of the poetry of devotion" 
(1977a:183).
3.2. i'HE SIGNIFICANCE OF HICK'S THEORIES FOR A IMITIVB 
PLURALISM OF RELIGIONS
In his conclusion to his essay: "Jesus and the World Religions", 
Hick (1977a:183 -184) expresses the hope that "Christianity will 
outgrow its theological fundamentalism as it has largely outgrown 
its biblical fundamentalism." By so doing, this faith will have 
removed a key stumbling-block to meaningful interreligious 
dialogue and to the realisation of a global theology of 
religions.
Inplied in his approach to the central symbol of Christianity is 
a call for all world religions to understand the Tillichian 
premise that religious language is essentially symbolic and 
should therefore not be understood literally. Comparing 
Christology with BUddhology, therefore, Hick (1973b:117) states 
that the myth of the incarnation is much like the Trikaya myth 
with which Mahayana Buddhists attempted to speak about the 
mystery they had encountered in Buddha. He does not, however, 
dictate for Buddhism the way in which she should reinterpret her 
myth. As a Christian, he does not have the expertise to do this. 
Nor can he do so for other faiths.
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But, for Hick (1977a:180), (like the theorists described above), 
it seems clear that the differing religions "are being called 
today to attain a religious vision which is aware of the unity of 
all mankind before God and which at the same time makes sense of 
the diversity of God's ways within the various streams of human 
life." The other world religions have also produced great 
saints, mystics and thinkers, and have been sources of spiritual 
and moral life and orderly frameworks of social existence, for 
many millions of men and women through many centuries. "To 
dismiss them as inferior now seems dangerously reminiscent of the 
traditional arrogance of the white man towards the black and 
brown majority of mankind" (Hick, 1983:78).
Hick further emphasises the above point by calling our attention
to the fact that, in most cases, the religion which one follows
*
depends largely upon where one happens to be born. Thus, he 
contends that, given the fact that there are various cultural 
ways of being human, we can to some extent understand that 
differing religions are but different 'lenses' through which the 
divine Reality is differently perceived.
Here lies Hick's fundamental contribution to the realisation of a 
global theology of religions. Because humankind consists of 
diverse cultures, we should not expect that God should have made
*Hick expresses this sentiment in many works. See:Hick, God_ 
and the Universe of Faiths, p. 135; Hick, God Has Many 
NamesTp. 44; Hick and Hebblethwaite, Christianity and Other 
Religions, p. 172; and Hick, The Second Christianity, p. 78.
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his cevelation to mankind in a single mighty act. Once this point 
is grasped, adherents of the differing religious manifestations 
will be able to look beyond their secondary, human 
interpretations of the divine, to the Divine Reality itself. All 
the main religious traditions agree that the ultimate divine 
reality is infinite. It follows, therefore, that this reality 
cannot be defined or encompassed by human thought. Thus no 
religious tradition (which is but a human interpretation of the 
divine reality) can draw boundaries round the nature of God and 
say that he is this and no more. All must be seen as equal ways 
of reaching out to God (Hick, 1973:173 - 179).
4. ONITIVE PLURALISM : A CRITIQUE
The above attempts at recognition of a unitive pluralism of world 
religions at least represent the genuine attempt on the part of 
many to grope towards a viable solution to the oroblem of 
conflicting religious truth-claims. All the models discussed 
above remind us that finite man cannot ever fully describe the 
nature of our infinite God. As such, therefore, we are called 
unon to look beyond our differing inadequate ways of describing 
tod, to the centra) core of all relinion, namely, God Himself. 
Such an approach snould, paradoxically, unite us in religious 
diversity.
Whilst unitive pluralists have smelt out the theoretical basis 
for a new global theology of diverse faiths, it remains to be
\
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seen whether the ideal can be successfully imolemented in 
practice. Those involved in current interfaith dialogue do not 
represent the large majority of religious men who still staunchly 
adhere to the traditionalist claims of their particular faiths. 
Arguably, this majority can be led over to the unitive 
pluralistic approach through education. But, since most 
education systems throughout the world are based on a particular 
religious (or non-religious) ideology, it is doubtful whether 
such education will ever succeed.
The key problem in this regard is that the premise that a central 
belief of a particular faith is but a mere symbol or must be 
regarded by the believer as a 1 nonessential' of true religion, is 
a contradiction in terms. Hick, for example, with good 
intention, attempts to reinterpret the central belief of 
Christianity in order that Christians might see beyond the symbol 
and realise the fact of diverse perceptions of the one God. But,
by recognising the incarnation as a myth, he denies the very
essence of the Christian faith. Such an approach will never be 
fully accepted by the vast majority of adherents to any 
particular faith. To ask that they see their essential beliefs 
as myths is tantamount to asking that they give up their meaning 
in existence.
In this regard, Ben Engelbrecht , f-r example, contends that the 
Christian faith, by definition, stands or falls by the doctrine
of the Incarnation. He further points out that the question as
-0 exactly what was incarnate in Jesus, cannot be answered with a 
reference to that which, to a greater or lesser degree was made
incarnate in all the prophets of God. Such an approach ^would 
result in Christendom ceasing to be Christendom (1981a:25).
In terms of Engelbrecht's argumentation, therefore, Smith, seems 
to provide a more feasible approach to that of Hick whereby the 
fact of unitive pluralism can be promoted amongst people of 
diverse faiths. Smith indicates, from a historical perspective, 
the manner in which the differing faiths have in fact always 
participated in the same religious process. On this point, he and 
Hick concur, but, Smith does not go so far as to reinterpret the 
essence of any faith. Instead, he presents the unitive pluralism 
of religions as an empirical, historical fact. He further 
contends that this fact needs to be recognised by all faiths in 
order for a brotherhood 01 man (a moral imperative in all 
religions) to become a reality.
■
Birmingham. 21 - 24 September 1981.
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One must, however, question Smith's call for the abolition of the 
terms 1 religion1 as well as titles for the various religions. 
Whether these accurately describe the phenomena they purport to 
define or not, they cannot simply be disregarded. They too form 
part of the long historical process of the religious development 
of mankind and certainly cannot be divorced from it.
Finally, it was noted above that the unitive pluralists take all 
religious beliefs very seriously as being manifestations of the 
Divine Reality, Such an attitude does not, however, cancel out 
the question as to whether it is at all possible for any faith 
fully to accept such an idea without becoming a mere relative 
entity.
This fear of relativism on the part of many staunch adherents of 
differing faiths is perhaps a major reason for their refusal to 
endorse the thesis of global theology. In the following chapter," 
the model provided by Ernst Troeltsch as a solution to this 
particular issue will be examined.
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CHAPTER 3 HISTORICISM: FACING THE PROBLEM OF RELATIVISM
L. INTRODUCTION
rhe previous chapter pointed towards a dialogue between the 
aifferent religions on the basis of what is common to each. From 
that discussion it is apparent that there is much to suggest that 
a feasible solution to the problem of religious pluralism is to 
be found in the essential unity which lies at the root of all the 
major religions of mankind.
However, the phenomenon of a unitive pluralism of religions 
raises the obvious contention that all faiths are therefore 
merely relative to one another. The danger of the above view is
that it tends to make fundamental nonsense of each faith as it
leads to an attitude of "anything goes".
A significant figure who sought to come to terms with this
particular problem is Ernst Troeltsch (1865 - 1923). The driving 
force behind this quest was his deep interest m
historical thinking (which he refers to as 'historicism' ) and 
its effect on the modern consciousness.
★The essay in which Troeltsch deals with historicism, namely, 
"Det Historismus und seine probleme" (1922) has yet to 
translated. I am thus reliant upon secondary sources for an 
exposition of the concept,
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"According to this mode of thought, all historical phenomena must 
be approached empathetically and objectively. They must be 
interpreted in their own terms before any value judgemer ts are 
applied to them" (Santmire, 1973:367). Therefore, no religion ox: 
set of values should be denied its own irreducible significance.
Troeltsch realised that such a thought pattern would seriously 
question the traditional claims of any religion to exclusiveness. 
Christianity, for example, was to be recognised as being but one 
religious belief amongst the many others that have manifested 
themselves in history. In historicist terms there can be no 
•absolute' religion.
Having recognised this, however, he made it his life task to 
ensure that historical thinking did not result in the conclusion 
that all religious beliefs are merely relative to one another. 
"In the face of the absurdity of absolutism ... on the one hand, 
and of the emptiness of cultural relativism on the other, he. 
looked for a new statement of the valid ground for meaning. His 
struggle was a passionate one against meaninglessness" (Adams, 
1961:98); especially that form of meaninglessness, namely, an 
aimless 'cultural relativism', to which the logical positivists 
of his day subscribed.
As a deeply religious man, Troeltsch sought to remain true to 
historical thinking as well as to his Christian faith. This 
struggle was no mere intellectual one. It was profoundly
personal ana practical. This, whilst he rejected the notion of 
an .absolute' religion in terms of historical thinking, 'he would 
not abandon the attempt to discern in history a pattern of 
development that would support the Christian faith claim of 
universality" (Johnson, 1962:220).
„e therefore attempted to present a view of Christianity whereby 
it 'would retain its historically relative identity, while still 
being acknowledged as representing the highest stage of man's 
present spiritual development, and as indicating the direction of 
his future growth" (Johnson, 1962:220),
2. THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS of HISTORIC!,SM
Historicism developed out of two world-views which had preceded 
it; namely, traditionalism and rationalism.
To the traditionalists, Christianity was the absolute religion. 
Awareness of other religious cultures m s  very superficial. When 
Christians did come into contact with other cultures such as in 
the East through the voyages of discovery during the fifteenth 
and sixteenth centuries C.E., the tendency was towards conflict 
rather than dialogue because the traditionalists held firm to 
their absolutist stance (Hick, 1973a:118).
Reaction to traditionalism took the form of rationalism which 
came to full flower during the Enlightenment period of the
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/eighteenth century C.E. This epoch saw the quest, on the part of 
those who Were unhappy with the traditional mythological and 
supernaturalistic explanations of reality, towards more rational 
causes for all phenomena.
Rationalists therefore believed that all cultures and value 
systems, whether past or present, were to be seen as mere 
historical 'shells' in that they exist in history, but, their 
true meaning lies beyond it in the form of reason itself.
Prominent proponents of this view were men such as David Hume, 
Immanuel Kant, Gotthold Lessing and Sir James George Frazer, 
Their main contribution to the study of religion was that by 
viewing reason as the central core behind everything historical, 
it became possible for the differing religious cultures to 
coexist peacefully in that they were seen as being different 
manifestations of reason,
\
This attitude is particularly noticable in Lessing's play, Nathan 
the Wise (1779), in which a sold gold ring which represents the 
good moral life is confused with two exact replicas. The rings 
are worn by a Jew, a Christian and a Muslim respectively and yet 
they are so much alike that none of the wearers knows who has the 
original.
This idea of the rationalists gave rise to the historicist View 
that the various religions are but differing manifestations of
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the Divine.
The rejection of rationalism developed out of a disappointment 
with the 'Age of Reason' during the late eighteenth century C.E. 
One contributing factor was the terror that had been brought 
about by so-called "enlightened" leaders of the French 
Revolution. Another was that many philisophical thinkers now 
felt that the historical realm was not secondary to the rational 
core that lay behind it, but was just as essential to human 
experience as reason and should therefore be taken seriously. 
Men now turned to the study of the distant past (historic and 
mythological) in order to seek meaning in this life (santmire, 
1973:373). This age has been labelled: 'romanticism', whereas it 
in fact marks the dawn of the historical consciousness of man 
which Troeltsch was later to term: 'historicism'.
The method used in their study of history was that of
"Einffthlung", according to which one transcends one's own
cultural context and seeks to understand the cultural context of
others. Johann Gottfried Herder, the main proponent of this
method, describes it thus: "First sympathise with the nation, go
into the era, into the geography, into the entire history, feel 
*
yourself into it."
*Cited in Neff, E, (1947), The Poetry of History The 
Contribution of Literary Scholarship to the Writings of 
History since Voltaire. New York: Columbia University 
Press, p. 23. The emphasis is mine,
4Another great "romantic", was the German historian, Leopold von 
Rancke. He emphasised the historicist impulse to find uniqueness 
and value in every historical era through his expression: "jede
Epoch ist unmittelbar zu Gott" (every epoch is immediately 
present to God). According to H. Paul Santmire (1973:375), this 
attitude of von Rancke towards history, provided the historicist 
approach with a certain theological underpinning. It was Max 
Mueller, however, who applied the science of history as found in 
Herder and von Rancke to the study of religion. His aim was to 
investigate the various religions, as if from the inside, through 
the eyes of the believers of those faiths. Only once this had 
been done could the question of meaningful patterns of historical 
events be raised.
3. TROELTSCH'S DEFINITION OP 'HISTORICISM'
Troeltsch set forth his conception of the assumptions and
consequences of the modern historical method in an essay written
in 1900 entitled: "Uber Histor ische .und Dogmatise he Methods in 
*
der Theologie". There he emphasised three aspects of the
♦This work has not yet been translated into English. For an 
exposition of its content I have been reliant upon the 
following works: Quarberg, D. (1961). "Historical Reason, 
Faith and the Study of Religion." In: Journal for the
Scientific Study of Religion, 1:1. October; Stackhouse, 
mTZT (1962). "Troeltsch1s Categories of Historical 
Anaivsis." In: Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 
1:2. April; and Adams, J.L. (1971). "Introduction." in: 
Troeltsch, E. (1971). The Absoluteness of Christianity and 
the History of Religions, tr. David Reid. Richmond, 
Virginia: John Knox Press.
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Another great "romantic", was the German historian, Leopold von 
Rancke. He emphasised the historicist impulse to find uniqueness 
and value in every historical era through his expression: "jede
Epoch ist unmittelbar zu Gott" (every epoch is immediately 
present to God). According to H. Paul Santmire (1973:375), this 
attitude of von Rancke towards history, provided the historicist 
approach with a certain theological underpinning. It was Max 
Mueller, however, who applied the science of history as found in 
Herder and von Rancke to the study of religion. His aim was to 
investigate the various religions, as if from the inside, through 
the eyes of the believers of those faiths. Only once this had 
been done could the question of meaningful patterns of historical 
events be raised.
3. TROELTSCH'S DEFINITION OB' 'HISTORICISM'
Troeltsch set forth his conception of the assumptions and
consequences of the modern historical method in an essay written
in 1900 entitled: "Uber Historische .und Dogmatische Methods in 
*
der Theologie". There he emphasised three aspects of the
*This work has not yet been translated into English. For an 
exposition of its content I have been reliant upon the 
following works: Quarberg, D. (1961). "Historical Reason, 
Faith and the Study of Religion." In: Journal for the
Scientific Study of Religion, 1:1. October; Stackhouse, 
(1962), "Troeltsch1 s Categories of Historical 
Analysis." in: Journal lor the Scientific Study of Religion, 
1*2. April; and Adams, J,L. (1971). "Introduction." In: 
Troeltsch, E, (1971). The Absoluteness of Christianity and 
the History of Religions, tr. David Reid. Richmond, 
Virginia: John Knox"Press.
historical method.
The first is the habit of mind associated with historical 
criticism. This habit of mind is a highly critical one which is 
exercised with no limitations. All traditions are placed under 
scrutiny, but, in doing so, the historian aims to approach the 
data with an empathetic understanding whilst at the same time 
being an independent and autonomous entity.
David Quarberg (1961:123) quotes Troeltsch as saying that "the 
implication of this aspect of the historical mode of thought is 
that in the realm of history there are only judgements of 
probability." Thus, the certainty that was characteristic of 
previous non-historical thought was no longer possible. 
Such reasoning would obviously have far-reaching ramifications 
for tradition.
The second aspect of the historical method is that of analogy 
which is employed as the instrument whereby historical criticism 
becomes possible. Historical phenomena are compared with each 
other in order to establish the similarities that exist between 
them. This process involves the comparison of past historical 
phenomena to those of the present. The data that has been drawn 
from the analysis of a present historical phenomenon is linked to 
past historical situations. In this way it is possible to be 
critical of the 'given facts' of past historical phenomena and 
ultimately to impute probability as to their historicity.
Analogy is related to the third aspect of the historical method; 
the correlation of all historical happenings. Having been 
compared, it is assumed that the various historical phenomena are 
related to each other. There is an interaction of all phenomena 
in the history of civilisation. Analogy and correlation, 
therefore, bring all of history into a common arena. According 
to Adams (1971:9), they provide the method of "levelling" all
historical phenomena.
Troeltsch held that the eirployment of these three devices by the
historical method produces a "mutually interacting web of
activities flowing out of the human mind which at no point are
independent and absolute, but are in relationship at every
point." He further sums up the craft of the historian as "the art
of entering sympathetically into the original content of
historical events, and of discovering correlative and mutually 
*
determining changes."
*These quotations are translated by QUarberg from 
Troeltsch1s: "Uber Historische und Dogmatische Methods in
der Theologie." (1900), Quarberg, however, does not cite 
the page numbers from which the quotations are taken. See: 
Quarberg, D. (1961). "Historical Reason, Faith and the 
Study of Religion." In: Journal for the Scientific Study of 
Religion, 1:1. October, p. 123.
In later works, Troeltsch presents several categories of 
**
historical analysis. The prime one is that of "individuality", 
whereby the historian divides history into various epochs in 
order to expose the unique aspects of each "individual totality" 
(historical unit). The relationship of past individual 
totalities to those of the present is governed by the category of 
latency whereby old individual totalities produce new ones 
through the organisation of various elements of the individuality 
which are then moved onwards by attraction or repulsion into new 
constellations.
The new individual totalities which emerge from the old are 
categorised by Troeltsch as developments. These are revealed in 
social and institutional forms in a variety of ways. Latency is 
therefore never exhausted by a single manifestation but 
continually moves towards fuller articulation. For this reason, 
one must constantly raise the question as to the origin of an 
individual totality, its direction and its function in 
civilisation.
*see: Troeltsch, "Der Historismus und seine Problems."
(1922). The content of this work is outlined for English 
readers in Tillich, P. (1961). "E. Troeltsch: Hisfonsmus
Und Seine Problems," (A review). in: Journal foi. the
Scientific Study of Religion, 1:1. October. See also: 
Troeltsch, E. (1911). "Contingency" and Historiography 
in: Hastings, J. Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, vol.
4. Edinburgh: T and T Clarke.
**The discussion which follows is based on the exposition 
given in: Stackhouse, M.L. (1962). "Troeltsch's Categories 
of Historical Analysis." In: Journal for the Scientific 
Study of Religion, 1:2. April, pp. 224 - 225.
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A category that plays a role in the determining of developments 
is that of contingency. By this, Troeltsch refers to the 
convergence of several series of mutually independent causes 
which brings about a pattern of its own. Examples of such causes 
are the impact of food supplies, death, and the birth of genius. 
To the historian, these are contingencies; and it is his task to 
note the convergence of these laws in the concrete and expose the 
peculiar patterns formed by their convergence.
Contingency in turn makes the category of freedom a real 
possibility in that a person or individuality may become one of 
the converging causes that determine the developmental process of 
a particular individual totality. As such, a person or 
individuality is not totally at the disposal of any historical 
process or social determination.
Besides the above categorisation as to the way in which history 
operates, Troeltsch also describes the categories that the 
historian must use in approaching historical phenomena. Through 
limited selection of those factors in history which expose the 
characteristic features of history and their subsequent 
representation through particular examples as characterising the 
particular unity, the historian can discern the unity of value 
(or significance) of a historical unit. This process is 
necessary in that judgements of value must be made in regard to 
the peculiarities of each historical unit.
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/These judgements, repcesentations and selections must, however, 
ultimately be swallowed up by history itself. The reason for 
this is that the judgement of the historian is conditioned by the 
historical individuality in which he stands and by which he is 
called to make the effort to understand history.
Troeltsch's hopes of producing a work in which a fully developed 
philosophy of history was envisaged were halted by his premature 
death in 1923. The possibilities of sound historical method were 
thus never exhausted by him.
4. TROELTSCH'S APPLICATION OF THE HISTORICAL METHOD TO RELIGION
4.1 MIRACLE AND EVOLUTIONARY APOIPGETIC
The abovementioned essenricIs of historical method were applied 
by Troeltsch to the field of religion (with particular reference 
to hue Christian religion) in his work: The Absoluteness of
Christianity and the History of Religions (1902). He begins by 
pointing out two ways in which Christianity has laid claim to 
absoluteness, namely: "miracle apologetic" (1971:47 - 48) and
"evolutionary apologetic" (1971:49 - 50),
Miracle apologetic defends Christianity as being the absolute
♦Troeltsch, E, (1902). The Absoluteness of Christianity and 
the History of Religions, tr. David Reid (1971). Richmond, 
Virginia: John Knox Press.
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faith because of the fact that it is attended by miracles. 
Troeltsch, however, failed to see how one could give credence to 
the Christian miracles and yet deny the validity of those which 
are claimed by non-Christian religions. Furthermore, he argues 
(1971:48) that "however frequently one may discern something 
supernatural in the ethical power of the inner life, no means
exist by which to construe the Christian's elevation above
sensuality as supernatural while interpreting that of Plato or 
Epictetus as natural."
Evolutionary apologetic appears to be a break from the
traditionalist "miracle" approach and reflects a more 
rationalistic line of thought. This view holds that the essence 
of religion lies in religion itself, in other words, religion 
Egr se is the core behind the various historical religious 
manifestations. These apologetics also pose an evolutionary 
process of religion ranging from the primitive through to the 
highest religion which is seen as being Christianity.
Against this, Troeltsch (1971:85) argues that Christianity must 
be viewed in every moment of its history as "a purely historical 
phenomenon, subject to all the limitations to which any
individual historical phenomenon is exposed, just like the other 
great religions." He argues further (1971:69) that "history 
gives us no indication whatever of any graded progression such as 
evolutionary apologetic might lead us to suspect." such a theory 
runs counter to the individuality of historical events and
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cultures and, therefore, terms such as absolute religion or 
absolute personalities are self contradictory. All historical 
phenomena have their own unique individuality and are relative to 
one another. As such, Christianity cannot lay claim to the 
status of the absolute religion.
4.2 AN AIMLESS RELATIVISM?
Having discarded both miracle and evolutionary apologetic, 
Troeltsch investigates the problem posed by historical 
relativism. It was his commitment as a Christian theologian that 
led him to fight against an aimless relativism that could so 
easily result from the historicist view of individuality.
To resolve this problem, Troeltsch (1971:94 - 95) proposed that 
the possibility existed "of comparing „..e most important elements 
and values of the main religious orientations, ranking them in 
accordance with a criterion of value and subsuming them under the 
idea of a common goal". He thus applied the historical 
principles of analogy and correlation to religion.
Thus, according to Troeltsch (1971:95), the different religious 
manifestations "can be measured and compared with one another as 
regards the simplicity, depth and power with which they disclose 
a higher transcendent life in God". The criterion of Value will 
emerge from the religion that is strongest and most profound. 
Troeltsch grants the fact that this is a subjective criterion but
he points out (1971;96) that there is no other way to obtain a 
criterion that will enable us to choose among competing 
historical values,,
In effect, therefore, what Troeltsch suggested was the existence 
of a universally valid goal towards which all religions are 
directed. The goal is a transcendent one but can only Lx; sought 
from within a particular historical situation via the various 
religious manifestations. The goal of religion lies beyond 
history but the means to the goal lies within it. Some religious 
manifestations reveal the goal with more clarity than others and 
thus there exists a natural gradation of religions within 
history.
According to Troeltsch (1971:98 - 99), this gradation gives rise 
to "the expectation that the goal-directed impetus existing in 
this idea of an ultimate objective may lead to a revelation that 
is in principle definitive and final". The realisation of this 
final revelation, he believed would not come from any new 
religion but would arise out of the existing religious 
manifestations as "within culture generally, really new 
developments are exceptional". This final revelation would, 
however, be; "the purest and most profound idea of God" 
(Troeltsch, 1971:103).
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4.3 CHRISTIANITY A? TOE HIGHEST RELIGION "FOR UET
The next point which Tcoeltsch raises is the question of whether 
historicism includes the positive acknowledgement of Christianity 
as being the highes eligion for us. He answers in the 
affirmative on the basis of a comparison of Christianity with the 
other great world faiths. In this comparison, he differentiates 
between those faiths which he regards as impersonal and those 
which are personal.
As far as the Indian (Eastern) religions are concerned, Troeltsch 
(1971:110) argues that in them, "divini.y now comes to mean pUie, 
highest being, or the supreme order of the world, in relation to 
which the world process signifies that this being, this order, is 
made obscure and finite." In terms of redemption, therefore, 
this means "the annulment of the world process and the 
obliteration of everything personal in pure being, since the 
existence and value of the personal constitute no problem for 
this type of religious apprehension."
Judaism and Islam are defined by Troeltsch as being "religions of 
law". Such religions, he argues, "are inferior in their ability 
to plumb the depths of the distinction between the world of the 
senses and the world of higher, transcendent values. They simply 
juxtapose the two worlds and call for an ascent to the higher by
*See: Troeltsch, Absoluteness..., pp. 107 - 116.
the summoning up of powers that exist in the nature of the soul" 
(1971:109). Therefore, according to Troeltsch (1971:110), these 
religions also lack personalism in that "redemption conceived on 
the basis of law remains forever bound to achievements that man 
produces out of his own nature, while the redeeming divinity ... 
always remains a thing-like being that lacks the vital, 
activating power needed to tear men away from the world and 
return than, transformed, to confront the world again."
In contrast to the above faiths, Troeltsch (1971:110) argues that 
in Christianity, "we find a complete and radical disengagement of 
God and of souls from the world; the elevation of both into the 
sphere of personality where nature is shaped and overcome and 
where unconditioned value is realized; and the overcoming of all 
that is given merely existent, by an infinite and intrinsic value 
that bursts forth from the depths of the world and finds 
expression in practical conduct."
In terms of the comparison of the great world faiths, Troeltsch 
(1971:114) concluded that Christianity Was not only "the 
culmination point", but also "the convergence point of all the 
developmental tendencies that can be discerned in religion". 
Through it, man no longer had to obey a code of laws or wade 
through an illusory world in order to achieve salvation. Whilst 
the religions of law do proclaim the divine will, "they leave the 
natural man to overcome the world in his own st^ngth". On the 
other hand, the Eastern religions "dissolve man and the world in
the divine essence but in the process forfeit all positive 
meaning and content in the divine nature," Yet, Troeltsch 
affirms, it is only Christianity that "has disclosed a living 
deity who is act and will in contrast to all that is merely 
existent, who separates the soul from the merely existent and in 
this separation unites it with himself".
Thus, for Troeltsch, Christianity is the one religion that has 
truly come to grips with the complexity of the relationship 
between this world and a higher, a-historical world. In this 
religion, "the soul, purified from guilt and pride and granted 
assurance and security, is set to work in the world for the 
upbuilding of a kingdom of pure personal values, for the 
upbuilding of the kingdom of God" (1971:114).
Troeltsch recognises that a higher revelation than Christianity 
may yet take place (although he doubts that this will happen). 
For this reason he states (1971:115) that we cannot and must not 
regard Christianity as an "absolute, perfect, immutable truth." 
It is rather; "the loftiest and most spiritual revelation that we 
know at all. It has the highest validity" (Troeltsch, 1957:21). 
Only in this sense, Troeltsch (1971:117) argues, can one refer to 
the "Absoluteness " of Christianity.
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4.4 CHRISTIANITY AND THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE VALIDITY OF 
OTHER RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
The next question which Troeltsch considers is whether the 
Absoluteness of Christianity, as he explained it, can satisfy 
ordinary devout people in their acknowledgement of and guest for 
God. In other words, the question under consideration is 
whether one can be a Christian and yet at the same time 
acknowledge that there are other "absolute" religions.
Troeltsch answers in the affirmative in that the ordinary 
religious man does not need to believe that he possesses the 
truth exclusively or that he possesses it in a complete and final 
form. The Christian can believe that in his religion he has 
actually found God and that this faith will never deceive him. 
That is all that matters.
Applying this logic to the religious man per se, Troeltsch 
(1971:122) states the following: "All he can do is to desire true 
participation in and true inner contact with the absolute and to 
seek the most forceful and profound God-centred life in the 
various historical manifestations where such participation is 
indicated." However, Troeltsch cautions the religious man not to 
wish to possess the absolute in an absolute way as to do so is a 
delusion,
*See: Troeltsch, Absoluteness..., PP> 117 - 129.
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In term' of Christianity, therefore, "all that the Christian 
needs ... is the certainty that within the Christian orientation 
of life there is an authentic revelation of God and that nowhere 
is a greater revelation to be found. ... With complete composure 
he can consign to the world to come the absolute religion that 
represents not struggling faith but changeless and certain 
knowledge of the truth" (Troeltsch, 1971:123).
4.5 CHRISTIAN!1! - - THE ABSOLUTE AMONGST ABSOLUTES?
The final point discussed by Troeltsch is whether historicism has 
any positive significance for Christianity at all if it turns 
Christianity's ecclesiastical theory of absoluteness into a 
special instance of self-understanding common to all religion.
Troeltsch is of the opinion that the absoluteness that any aspect 
of life, be it law, religion or whatever, asserts for itself is a 
universal characteristic of what is termed the "naive" way of 
thinking. What is also universal is the process that eventually 
dissolves naive thinking, nanely the thinking that arises from 
comparison with other manifestations of the same type. This 
phase results in a certain amount of pain, anxiety and distress 
fcr fear of insecurity if one breaks away from something that was 
originally naturally regarded as absolute.
*See: Troeltsch, Absoluteness..., pp. 131 - 163.
/Eventually adjustrrents ace made to the initial naive view. In 
the case o£ religions, Troeltsch (1971:133) states that the 
adjustment process continues "until all the different kinds of 
religions have been juxtaposed, until all the contradictions and 
antitheses have been matched point for point in an effort to 
discover in these correlations an ultimate principle that will 
make possible a unified, coherent account rnd assessment of the 
whole. In this way the naive world view changes into a 
scientific one." This scientific approach does not necessarily 
lead to total disruption of the original absoluteness, but, 
rather liberates previous uacrow-mindedness by allowing for a 
more tolerant attitude towards other manifestations of the same 
type.
To illustrate which religious manifestation has reached the point 
of ultimacy that is required by the absolute religion (as opposed 
to naive absoluteness), Troeltsch (1971:141 - 144) once again 
examines various religious beliefs. His examination shows that 
the primitive religions were bound by ethnic ties and kinship and 
thus they lacked the universalism of the final absolute, 
pantheistic and mystic religons also lack this universalism in 
that their absoluteness depends upon the "thought and action of 
man" and "not upon an invading, apprehending will of the divine" 
(Troeltsch, 1971:141). Zoroastrianism is strictly a Persian 
religion and so, too, lacks universalism. Judaism too is bound 
to blood and cult. Islam binds its followers to the Qur'an 
(which Troeltsch regards as being confused because of the way in
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Eventually adjustments are made to the initial naive view. in
the case of religions, Troeltsch (1971:133) states that the 
adjustment process continues "until all the different kinds of 
religions have been juxtaposed, until all the contradictions and 
antitheses have been matched point for point in an effort to 
discover in these correlations an ultimate principle that will 
make possible a unified, coherent account and assessment of the 
whole. In this way the naive world view changes into a 
scientific one." This scientific approach does not necessarily 
lead to total disruption of the original absoluteness, but, 
rather liberates previous narrow-mindedness by allowing for a 
more tolerant attitude towards other manifestations of the same 
type.
To illustrate which religious manifestation has reached the point 
of ultimacy that is required by the absolute religion (as opposed 
to naive absoluteness), Troeltsch (1971:141 - 144) once again 
examines various religious beliefs. His examination shows that 
the primitive religions were bound by ethnic ties and kinship and 
thus they lacked the universallsm of the final absolute. 
Pantheistic and mystic religons also lack this universalism in 
that their absoluteness depends upon the "thought and action of 
man" and "not upon an invading, apprehending will of the divine" 
(Troeltsch, 1971:141). Zoroastrianism is strictly a Persian 
religion and so, too, lacks universal-1 sm. Judaism too is L and 
to blood and cult. Islam binds its followers to the Qur'an 
(which Troeltsch regards as being confused because of the way in
which it was compiled) and Arabic law and custom.
Troeltsch (1971:145) therefore concludes that it is only with 
Christianity, with the "personalistic religious idea and its 
liberating power" (as discussed earlier) as well as its preaching 
of the Kingdom of God, that we find "the complete 
individualisation and humanisation of religion." This makes its 
natural absoluteness "the purest and most inwardly-orientated 
expression of the power of religion" aid therefore also the 
highest religion thus far until the appearance of any higher 
religious life.
5. THE ADEQUACY OF TROELTSCH IN SOLVING THE PROBLEM OP THE
*
CONFLICTING TRUTH-CLAIMS OF WORLD RELIGIONS - A CRITIQUE
Having outlined Troeltsch's application of historicism to the 
field of religion, it is now necessary to examine the adequacy of 
his views as a solution to the problem under investigation, 
namely, the conflicting truth-claims of world religions.
Troeltsch's view that there exists within history a natural
*The following critique is largely my own. This is because 
most of the sources that were consulted on Troeltsch are 
merely translations of some of his essays. Those sources 
that do raise questions about Troeltsch*s historicist method 
concentrate mainly on issues that are pertinent to the 
perspective of the particular author. As most of these 
authors (with the exception of Knitter) wish to praise the 
legacy of Troeltsch for Christian theology, the type of 
critique that is presented here does not occur.
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gradation of religions is problematical in that he appears to 
have lost sight of his own argument which he presented as a 
polemic against evolutionary apologetic. If history gives us no 
indication of any upward movement within itself and each 
historical phenomenon has its own uniqueness and individuality, 
then the natural gradation of religion which he suggests 
represents a blatant contradiction of his historicist principles.
Santmire (1973:366) points out that Troeltsch's assertion that 
the ordinary religious man need not believe that he possesses the 
truth exclusively or in a complete and final form does not tie up 
with the fact that the three great Abrahamic faiths, " m  their 
classical forms and in various ways, have been self-consciously 
exclusivistic." Coupled with this is the fact that both 
Christianity and Islam profess their absolute status as an 
article of faith to which their "ordinary believers" hold firm. 
Troeltsch appears to have lost sight of this reality in his
argument.
As to the question of whether historicism includes the positive 
acknowledgement of Christianity as the highest religion for us, 
another problem has to be faced, this being the incompatibility 
between historicism and a historical phenomenon that is 
recognised as being the highest one. It is surely a grave 
contradiction in thought to assert, on the one hand, that 
"history is no place for 'absolute religions' or 'absolute 
personalities'" (Troeltsch, 1971:78), and yet on the other hand,
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to use histocicism to show that Christianity is the highest 
religion for us.
In this regard, Santmire (1973;367) points out that it must be 
remembered that Troeltsch was a deeply religious man. As a 
historicist he had to recognise the validity of other faiths for 
their believers, yet, as a committed Christian believer, he was 
defiant of an aimless relativism which resulted if one followed 
historicist principles to the letter. He thus used historicism 
to try and show the importance of Christianity to the Christian 
believer. By advocating a highest religion, he did not wish to 
discard the validity of other faiths. He rather wished to show 
the Christian believer that for him, Christianity is the highest 
religion and the only one through which Christians can realise 
the divine reality.
Paul Knitter highlights a key problem with this vein of 
Troeltscnian thought. He poses the question as to whether 
something that is regarded as being the truth for some can only 
be confined to that particular group. Furthermore, he asks: "Do
we not fenl that it can also be the truth for others,that others 
will find fuller life in embracing it? Stated philosophically, 
all truth is experienced as having universal revelance. Truth 
drives us to dialogue with others, to overcome the cultural, 
historical walls that separate us. Historical relativism, as 
Troeltsch presented it and as many others today embrace it, is 
perhaps not sufficiently aware of this" (1985:36). This issue
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causes Santmice (1973:392) to pose the question for Troeltsch as 
to whether a religious and ethical position that is developed 
solely in terms of one's own culture can ever be sufficient for 
mankind as a whole.
A further problem with this vein of Troeltschian thought is that 
if he wishes us to infer from it that for the Jew, Judaism is the 
highest religion, for the Muslim, Islam and so on, he never 
actually commits this point to writing. Santmire (1973:383) 
defends Troeltsch's failure in this regard as follows: "Troeltsch 
would say, indeed, that as a Christian it would be presumptuous 
of him to try to reestablish, let us say, the validity of 
Judaism."
One must, however, concede Troeltsch the point that a final
revelation has not yet appeared and thus each adherent of each
different religion is left only with the structure of his 
particular belief within which to realise the divine higher 
reality, As such, each religious believer considers his
particular faith to be the highest revelation of God to man.
Troeltsch, however, throws himself wide open to being interpreted 
as a Christian evangelist who aims to gain converts by indicating 
the inferiority of other faiths. His analysis of these other 
beliefs certainly does not assist the objective reader of his 
writings to conclude otherwise,
For example, whilst there is a great deal of truth to the
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statement that Judaism and Islam ace "religions of law" in that 
ad^  .vents of these faiths live by a legal system/ such a 
definition represents a gross over-simplification of two highly 
complex religious systems. In any event, the term: religion of
law", could also be applied to Christianity in that the Christian 
believer, who, by adhering to certain fundamental principles that 
are laid down by the faith, is able to gain access to Heaven as 
opposed to Hell at the eschaton.
Troeltsch's statement that the Eastern faiths lack personalism on 
the grounds that they view this world as illusory, is also open 
to doubt. The Hindu concept of the unity of one's soul with that 
of the Ultimate can surely be equated with Troeltsch's idea of a 
"personal" Christian deity "who separates the soul from the 
merely existent and in this separation unites it with himself 
(Troeltsch, 1971:114). Troeltsch therefore appears to contradict 
himself on this point.
Troeltsch's assertion that Christianity is the highest revelation 
yet known to man cannot prove that this is in fact the case. 
This is because a confession of any nature as regarcs religious 
claims would be a dogmatic one on the part of the believer. In 
any event, after almost two millennia of Christianity, the 
"lower" religions are still in existence. It follows, therefore, 
that if there was a gradation of religions culminating in the one 
which has the "purest and most profound idea of God" (Troeltsch, 
1971:103), these "lower" faiths Would surely have petered out if
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religion indeed had an evolutionary nature and Christianity was 
in fact the highest point of this evolution.
The question can also be raised as to whether Troeltsch has in
fact solved the problem for Christian believers as to which is
the highest religion of all. If we are to take his whole 
historicist thought literally, this would mean that all the 
religious manifestations are the highest ones for their 
particular adherents and that none of them may lay claim to the 
status of being the Absolute, let he goes to great lengths to
show that Christianity is the highest of all the religious 
manifestations. he does not provide an argument as to how the 
other faiths are to be regarded as the highest for their 
adherents. His arguments for Christianity also make it difficult 
to perceive how Judaism, for example, would be higher than 
Christianity for tne Jews since his reasoning shows the opposite 
to be the case.
Troeltsch (1911:239, did call for an abandonment of "the attitude 
wnich regards Jesus as the centre of the universe, or even the
centre of human history." Nevertheless, Knitter (1985:35) 
points out that in the person of Jesus, the Christians believe 
that "they have the Absolute become history, divinity incarnated 
in humanity, And therefore in this man, ... there present the 
full, final, normative revelation of God. The incarnation is the 
one grand exception to Troeltsch's otherwise iron-clad law of 
historical relativity." Clearly, therefore, the problem of the
strongest and most profound religion still remains.
There also seems to be a contradiction in Troeltsch's argument as 
to whether there will or will not be a revelation superseding 
Christianity. His arguments asserting Christianity as the 
highest revelation yet known to man do leave room for a higher 
revelation. On the other hand, his doubt that such a revelation 
will ever take place, as well as his obvious bias towards the 
Christian faith serve to illustrate the opposite.
In a lecture entitled: "The Place of Christianity among the World 
Religions" (1923), which was never delivered, but, was published 
posthumously, Troeltsch seems to have recognised this flaw in his 
original thought pattern. He repeated his assertion that 
Christianity is valid and true for Christians by stating that "it
is final and unconditional for us, because we have nothing else,
and because in what we have we can recognize the accents of the
divine voice" (Troeltsch, 1923:25). But, he continues by
commenting that "this does not preclude the possibility that 
other racial groups, living under entirely different cultural 
conditions, may experience their contact with the Divine Life in 
a quite different way, and may themselves also possess a religion 
which has grown up with them, and from which they cannot sever 
themselves so long as they remain what they are" (1923:25 - 26).
Thus Troeltsch modified his former theories as to the position of 
Christianity as opposed to thn otl.or religions, indeed, it is
102
striking to note his change of attitude as to the lack of 
'personality' in religions other than Christianity. He argues 
that the concept of personality "is always itself already one of 
the fundamental positions of the several religions, and is 
determined by them according to those respective general 
attitudes of theirs"(1923:25 - 26).
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Having changed his attitude towards religions that he previously 
regarded as being of a lower status than Christianity, Troeltsch 
(1923:30) states that if each religion "strives to fulfil its own 
highest potentialities, and allows itself to be influenced 
therein by the similar striving of the rest, they may approach 
and find contact with each other." Not only does this apply to 
the great world religions, "but it also applies to the various 
religious denominations, and to individuals in their intercourse 
with one another."
Troeltsch concludes this final lecture of his with words that 
strongly echo the unitive pluralist school and the current call 
for a global theology of religions. If there were ever doubts as 
to the application of his historicist principles to the field of 
religion because of contradiction, these are now dispelled by the 
following statement:-
"in our earthly experience the Divine Life is not one, but many. 
*Emphasis is mine.
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to apprehend the one in tha many constitutes the special 
acter of love" (1923:31).
i this stabemant, historicism, as a solution to the 
ilicting hruth-claims of world religons, regains its 
aibility. No one religion is recognised as being absolute.
, they cannot be regarded as being mere relative entities, 
h of them is the very truth and life to their respective
erents.
HISTORICISM REASSESSED
order to illustrate how historicism lays the basic ground- 
es according to which we in the present world can attempt to 
re to terms with the problem of religious pluralism, it is 
;essary to compare this approach to that of unitive pluralism. 
3m such a comparison, the following points arise:-
All these proponents of dialogue call for a recognition of 
a separate existence of each religious manifestation. By 
ipulating this principle, they entrench the historicist 
tegory of the individuality of each historical epoch.
These proponents call for a dialogue on the basis of empathy 
wards all religious beliefs. None of them stipulate that a 
rticular faith system is invalid. All religious beliefs are 
iken seriously. The Vnk between this attitude and the 
.storicist principle empathetlc understanding, is self
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evident.
3. All these views point towards a dialogue on the basis of
commonality. Such common ground is sought by means of limited
selection of particular facts that are common to all faiths. 
These facts serve as representations of the unity of value 
between differing religious systems. In other words, the 
historicist principles of analogy and correlation of facts are 
applied in order to arrive at their conclusion.
4. The recognition by some proponents of the common essence
view that a final, all-embracing religious belief will only be
realised in an a-historical situation ties up with Troeltsch's 
view that such a religion is a possibility.
5. The historicist principle that no historical epoch can claim 
to be final or absolute is distinctly evident in the common 
essence viewpoint.
6. The view that all religions have their common essence in
some or other form of Divine Reality links up with the strictly 
historicist view that every epoch is immediately related to God.
7. Propagators of the common essence view strongly emphasise 
that their thesis must not be misunderstood as a call for one 
world religion. Troeltsch's attempt to support the absoluteness 
of his particular faith is ironically linked to this principle. 
As was seen earlier, his intention was to defend the vitality of 
his faith despite the fact of other 'natural' absolutes.
8. The call for dialogue between Eastern and Western faiths in 
the hope of realising a global theology, although not a specific 
historicist principle, ties up with the analogy and correlation
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of historical facts. Such a dialogue will only be able to be 
pursued on this basis. In this regard, the historicist 
categories of limited selection of facts, representation and 
unity of value are also applicable.
9. Lastly, the call for Eastern and Western faiths to co­
operate towards change in the new pluralistic 'global village' 
cannot be divorced from the historicist categories cf latency, 
developments, and contingency. The category of latency is the 
fact that all religious beliefs appear to have the potential for 
peaceful existence with each other. This has now been fully 
exposed with the dawn of the pluralistic society in which modern 
man finds himself. The category of developments is evident in 
the many current atteirpts at dialogue towards a more global 
theology. The 'global village' situation is a contingency that 
has affected traditionalist attitudes and has led to change so 
that the historicist category of freedom (in the form of a true 
"brotherhood of man") may hopefully be fully realised in the 
future.
It appears, therefore, that although Troeltsch does not feature 
prominently as a proponent of unitive pluralism, he has 
articulated the basic ground-rules according to which the common 
essence view of religions has been formulated. Despite the 
rather negative critique that was given above, the greatness of 
Troeltsch lies in the fact that, at a time when Christianity was 
forced to come- to terms with the existence of other world 
religions because of the firm establishment of the
1Religionsgeschichtliche' movement, he posed a solution by 
calling for an empathetic understanding of all historical epochs.
With such an understanding there can be no absolutes in history 
and the basis is laid for dialogue among equals rather than 
monologue in which one party dictates in order to dominate the 
others. Applied to religion, the way is then open for dialogue 
among the differing religious beliefs without any absolutist 
claims on the part of any faith. This dialogue will then 
eventually, through the historicist principles of analogy and 
correlation, give rise to a greater understanding among world 
religions.
Historicism does not fully solve the problem of relativism, but, 
it does tend to avoid the issue of aimless relativism through the 
principle of empathy. It also does not cancel out the fact that 
two of the major world faiths (Christianity and Islam) are 
fundamentally absolutist. On the other hand, it lays down the 
principles for change in absolutist stance should this latency 
one day lead to developments in these faiths.
Nevertheless, when all is said and done, historicist ground-rules 
or not, the conflict between the differing religions remains a 
reality. Since the death of Troeltsch in 1923, comparison and 
correlation of the various religious manifestations has hardly 
led to peaceful coexistence among men of differing faiths, 
indeed, the tendency has rather been towards sharp conflict
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/than towards a desire to really co-operate and adopt various 
ideas. The only religious manifestation that has a structure 
that can accomirudate all the faiths is that of Hinduism, which 
stands in sharp ideological conflict to Christianity, Judaism and 
Islam.
Historicism, therefore, gropes towards a solution to the problem 
of religious pluralism. In practice, however, the conflict 
remains unresolved. Yet, Troeltsch himself had hinted at 
historicism culminating in a final eschatological solution by 
consigning the absolute religion to the world to come. Thus, 
whilst the 'global village' requires that we attempt to come to 
terms with the conflict in praxis, ultimately it seems that God, 
at the eschaton, will have the ultimate answer. This approach 
will be discussed in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 4 CONCLUSION
1. INTRODUCTION; AN ESCHATOLOGICAL SOLUTION
The earlier discussion of unitive pluralism pointed towards the 
theoretical feasibility of a global theology of religions. The 
key problem with such an approach, however, is that it tends to 
relativise each faith. As a solution to this, Troeltsch proposed 
the historicist method, according to which, the value and meaning 
of each particular religion for its adherents is taken seriously. 
The proviso is laid down, however, that the particular may not be 
absolutised.
It was noted in the previous chapter how the historicist method 
in fact laid the ground - rules according to which interfaith 
dialogue should be pursued. These ground-rules, however, do not 
serve to remove the conflict that exists between religious 
beliefs. Whilst they provide the guidelines according to which 
mutual understanding between men of differing faiths can be 
achieved, they do not provide an ultimate solution to the 
conflict.
It seems, therefore, that an ultimate solution lies beyond the 
historical realm at the eschaton. It was noted earlier how 
Troeltsch, in his application of historicist principles to
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religion, had hinted at such a possibility. Thus, an 
eschatological solution to the problem oC religious pluralism, 
although not fully developed by Troeltsch, forms part of the
historicist approach and is worthy of consideration.
Hick (1973bv147) expresses the opinion that beyond the current 
attempts at interfaith interaction, "the ultimate unity of faiths 
will be an eschatological unity in which each is both fulfilled 
and transcended - fulfilled insofar as it is true, transcended 
insofar as it is less than the whole truth. ... In the eternal 
life there is no longer any place for religions; the pilgrim has 
no need of a way after he has finally arrived."
A key issue as regards the conflicting truth-claims concerns the 
conflicting eschatological perspectives of Judaism and 
Christianity. Whilst the Jews still await the Messiah, the 
Christians believe that the final eschatological era has begun 
with Christ. Yet history shows no signs that mankind has been
redeemed. Martin Buber, speaking of Judaism and Christianity, 
notes that: "Pre-messianically, our destinies are divided. Now 
to the Christian, the Jew is the incomprehensibly obdurate man, 
who declines to see what has happened; and to the Jew, the
Christian is the incomprehensibly daring man, who affirms in an
unredeemed world that its redenption has been accomplished" 
(1974:276). Furthermore, he presents his particular 
eschatological approach to the conflict that exists between Jews 
and Christians thus: "The faith of Judaism and the faith of
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Christendom are by nature different in kind, ... and they will 
indeed remain different, until mankind is gathered in from the 
t:,!.les of the 'religions' into the Kingship of God" (1961:173
174).
In proposing an eschatological solution to the problem of 
religious pluralism in this chapter, I wish to specifically 
concentrate on Christianity and its relationship to Judaism as a 
central issue. The reason for the isolation of these specific 
faiths is that, because I have been raised according to tb-» 
Christian tradition, the perspective from which I approach the 
problem of conflicting truth-claims is largely confined to the 
Judaeo-Chrishian debate. Also, as far as the call for a move 
towards better interfaith relations is concerned, many Christian 
scholars have confined themselves to this particular issue. 
Furthermore, the theorists who were referred to in previous 
chapters of this work as well as those whose theories will be 
expounded in this chapter, also fall within the Judaeo-Christian 
frame of reference.
This Judaeo-Christian approach should not, however, be seen as a 
narrow one. The problem of conflicting truth-claims extends far 
beyond the confines of these two faiths. Nevertheless, I 
perceive tb,- opposing eschatological viewpoints of these two 
faiths as a key issue in the conflicting truth-claims debate. If 
a feasible eschatological solution can be reached whereby these 
opposing views of the eschaton can be reconciled, the way will be
clear to a recognition of the validity of all faiths until the 
final eschatological age arrives.
Frans Rosenzweig, a Jew who was on the verge of conversion to 
Christianity, but, in the end found fulfilment in Judaism, hinted 
at such an eschatological perspective. In a letter (October 31, 
1913) to his cousin, Rudolf Ehrenberg (a Christian), he writes
"Chosen by its Father, the people of Israel gazes fixedly across 
the world and history, over to the last, most distant time when 
the Father, the One and Only, will be 'all in all'" (Letter 
cited from Glatzer, 1961:341 - 342). As far as Christianity's 
claim to being the sole path of salvation is concerned, 
Rosenzweig points out that this cannot be so for the Jew. Even 
if all Jews were to submit to Jesus, Rosenzweig contends that, 
according to the New Testament, Jesus himself would ultimately 
"turn over his dominion to the Father, and then God will be All- 
in-All" (1970:412).
For Rosenzweig, therefore, the Jews do not need to convert to 
Christianity for salvation. The reason for this is simple. To 
the Jew, the fact that God is his Father "is the first and most 
self-evident fact." Therefore, the Jew has no need for a third 
person between himself and the Father in heaven. The Jews are 
God's chosen people. Thus, Rosenzweig asks: "Should I 'be
converted,' when I have been 'chosen' from birth? Is that a real
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*alternative for me?"
As God's chosen people, the Jews are already with the Father, 
Because the patriarch Abraham heard the call of God and answered 
it, the Jew no longer needs to become onr with the Father in some 
decisive moment of his individual life as Christianity demands of 
him. "Th decisive moment, the great Now, the miracle of 
rebirth, lies before the individual life. In the individual life 
there is found only the great Here, the viewpoint, the station, 
the house and the circuit, in short all that is granted to man in 
the mystery of his first birth" (1970:396).
Until the arrival of the eschaton, Rosenzweig recognised that the 
church and synagogue must go their separate ways with very 
distinct but equally important roles in the spiritual structure 
of the world (1970:415). Nahum Glatzer (1961:342) quotes 
Rosenzweig as saying that, despite these separate paths, both 
religions look forward to the sane ultimate hope that is rooted 
in their common ground - the hope of being with God at the 
eschaton.
Matt Hershel (1975) also recognises that these two faiths must 
exist as separate entities until the eschaton when the messianic
*These quotations are taken from Rosenzweig's letter to Eugen 
Rosenstock-Huessy (October,19l6;the exact day is not given). 
For a full translation of the German original, see: 
Rosenstock-Huessy, B. ed. (1969). Judaism Despite 
Christianity. Alabama: University of Alabama Press, pp. 107
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goal is to be achieved. Both, however, pursue this common goal 
despite their blindness to each other's true nature and to the 
full measure of each other's validity. However, "together they 
can, and are obliged to, both work and wait for the coming of the 
promised messiah. And together they can cherish the certainty - 
since each knows that the Lord has promised but one messiah - 
that he whose second coming is awaited by the Christian and he 
whose coming is awaited by the Jew will be seen, when he comes,
to have the sane face..." (He-shel, 1975:405).
This statement is problematical in that it implies that Jews will 
then recognise Jesus' messianic/divine status. On the other 
hand, it brings home the point that, whoever this messiah is to 
be, he will be the one chosen by cod. And if he happens to be 
Jesus, the Jews still would not have needed to convert to 
Christianity, and likewise, the Christian would not have needed 
conversion to Judaism as a prerequisite for entry into the 
Kingdom of God.
Rosenzweig expressed these sentiments in another letter to 
Ehrenberg, dated November 1, 1913. There he wrote
"I know that I have vanished only before the will of your Lord ;
but I am not forgotten by God - that God whom one day your Lord 
too will serve" (Letter cited in Glatzer, 1961:28 - 29).
This common eschatological hope of both faiths was recognised by
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a conciliar declaration of the Second Vatican Council of the 
Roman Catholic Church which states that: "In company with the 
prophets and the apostle Paul, the Church awaits that day, known 
to God alone, on which all peoples will adress the Lord in a 
single voice and 1 serve him with one accord' (Zeph. 3:9; cf.Isa. 
66:23; Ps. 65:4; Rom. 11:11 - 32)" (Abbot, 1966:665).
The question must however be raised as to whether these views of 
Rosenzweig, Hershel and Vatican II are adequate as a solution to 
the conflicting eschatological ideologies of these two faiths. 
Of the many examples of Christian persecution of Jews over two 
millennia which serve to illustrate the Jewish viewpoint that the 
world as yet is not redeemed, the one that is most vivid to 
present day Jewry is that of the Holocaust. It has already been 
noted how the New Testament laid down the Meological basis for 
this atrocity.
Eliezer Berkovits, an ardent opposer of all attempts at Jewish- 
Christian dialogue that does not take the above fact into 
account, points out that from a Jewish point of view, "the 
theological meaning of the concentration camps and the crematoria 
is that the guilt of man has never been taken away from him 
through any divine self-sacrifice. But for the non-Jew, too, 
man's historic experience, especially in the 20th century, has 
shown that the God who according to Christian teaching came into
*In this regard see also: Berkovits, E. (1978). "Pacing the 
Truth." in: Judaism, vol. 27, no. 3.
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the world for the specific purpose of human salvation, was 
nowhere when salvation was most needed" (1966s80).
Gregory Baum (1974:7), from a Christian perspective, recognises 
this problem for Christianity and states that an examination of 
the very centre of the Christian proclamation as well as a 
reinterpretation of the gospel is therefore necessary. The 
encounter of Auschwitz demands that this be done.
Baum (1974:9) points out that "the holocaust teaches the Church 
that any monopolistic claim to divine truth or any form of 
ecclesiastical self-elevation will eventually translate itself 
... into social attitudes and political action and hence generate ' 
grave injustices that eventually accumulate to become major 
crimes."
Another Christian theologian, Tom Driver (1981:3 - 4), reflects 
thus on the present historical state of man. "We live on a sick 
planet. The earth is sick with suffering, and we who dwell here 
are like the inhabitants of a city struck by plague. In such a 
time, what, if anything, should the church teach about Christ? 
Is Jesus our savior now, or has he also caught the contagion? 
What has the church to say to the world on the verge of 
collapse?"
Thus there is currently an urgent call for a reinterpretation of 
the traditional Christian belief of an already realised
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eschatology in Christ. A fruitful Christian-Jewish encounter
*
cannot be realised unless this call is heeded.
A few Christian scholars have indeed heeded this call. Hick's 
reinterpretation of the doctrine of the Incarnation, for example, 
has a]ready been noted. With regard to a reinterpretation of the 
Christian understanding of eschatology, however, Rosemary Ruether 
stands out as a key figure. Her reinterpretation, to be 
discussed below, takes cognisance of the present unredeemed state 
of man and provides the basis for a final, as yet unrealised, 
eschatological solution to the Jewish-Christian conflict.
2. ROSEMARY RUETHER; A REINTERPRETATION OP CHRISTIAN 
"REALISED ESCHATOLOGY"
Ruether (1974:238 - 239) argues that the Christian eschatological 
viewpoint "does not take seriously the independent histories and 
identities of other peoples," Furthermore, it represents but a 
particular language about the universal whereas "the only 
universality which can be truly said to be 'of God' is one that 
transcends every particularity, guaranteeing the integrity of 
each people to stand before God in their own identities and 
histories (Mic. 4:5)."
*In this regard see also: Pawlikowski, J. T. (1977),
"Christ and the Christian-Jewish Dialogue." In: Chicago
Studies, 16, pp. 367 -368; and Pawlikowski, J. T. (1982).
Christ in the light of Christ ian-Jewish Dialogue. New York:
Paulist, p. 7.
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Christianity, by assuming that the Messiah has already come, 
has,according to Ruether (1974:240), applied to itself the 
characteristics of the "eschatological era" and, by so doing, has 
historicised the eschatological. In effect, therefore, "the 'two 
eras' - the historical world and the messianic age to come - 
become the Christian historical era, over against Judaism as the 
type of unredeemed humanity."
Ruether (1974:242 - 243) outlines the main flaw of such thinking 
in terms similar to those already expressed above. "The claim 
that the eschatological Body of Christ is one's institutional 
foundation, ... is read with a literalism that renders the Church 
unable to account for the imperfection of its historical 
existence. ... The reality of unredeemed existence continues 
despite these tricks of realized eschatology played upon 
history." For this reason, Judaism cannot accept that the 
Messiah has already come.
"For Israel, the coming of the Messiah and the coming of the 
Messianic Age are inseparable. They are in fact the same thing. 
Israel's messianic hope was not for the coming of a redemptive 
person whose coming would not change the outward ambiguity of 
human and social existence, but for the coming of that Messianic 
Age which ... is 'the solution to the riddle of histor 
(Ruether, 1974:247).
Ruether (1974:248) contends that the Church's historicising of
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the eschatological is illegitimate and that the ultimate 
f.schatological event must still signify a "final" future, 
jesus, had expressed the eschatological expectation W’th his 
proclamation: 'the Kingdom is at hand'. As such, he became to be 
remanbered as a "paradigm of that final hope which has not yet 
been accomplished, but still lies ahead of our present 
possibilities."
Such a paradigm may, according to Ruether, be experienced again 
and again in that community which preserves the memory of Jesus. 
"But this experience and person in the past does not become the 
final eschatological event of history, placing all history before 
that time in an obsolescent and morally inferior relation to 
itself or invalidating the access to God of those who go forward 
on other grounds" (1974:248).
Driver (1981:60) expresses these same sentiments thus: "As I look 
at the suffering world today, at the role the far-flung churches 
play within it; and at my own stumbling life, I come to think 
that the church's big mistake has been to imprison God in the 
likeness of Jesus. Something done for our freedom has been 
turned into a mold in which we try to hold God fixed. Since God 
cannot be contained, we encapture only ourselves."
In this regard, Ruether (1974:249), concludes that "the messianic 
meaning of Jesus' life ... is paradigmatic and proleptic in 
nature, not final and fulfilled." Jesus provides his followers
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with a basis for their refusal to take evil as the last word and 
for their hope that God will win in the end. Jesus also points 
to a finality that lies in the future and towards which we must 
constantly strive.
If Jesus is not the final paradigm of hope for the eschatolog-’cal
future, then it follows that paradigms of other faiths can carry
out the same function. Therefore, the Christian paradigm of the
Resurrection is complementary or paralie], to the Jewish paradigm
of the Exodus. "In each case the experience of salvation in the
past is recounted as the paradigm for continued hope experienced
in the present and pointing to the final hope which is still
ahead of both Jews and Christians. When Easter is seen, not as
superseding and fulfilling the Exodus, but as reduplicating it,
then the Christian can affirm his faith through Jesus in a way
that no longer threatens to roo the Jew of his past, eliminate
his future, and surround his present existence with rivalrous
*
animosity" (Ruether, 1974:256 - 257).
Ruether (1974:250) believes that this paradigmatic and propleptic 
view of the messianic work of Jesus is the only theologically and 
historically valid way of interpreting it consistent with 
biblical faith and historical realism.
*See also: Ruether, R. R. (1981). To Change the World: 
Christology and Cultural Criticism. New York: crossroad, 
pp. 42 -43.
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tRelating this paradigmatic understanding of Christian 
eschatological perception to the Christian theology of the "New 
Covenant", Ruether asks whether Christians should not say today 
"that this messianic covenant lies as much ahead of the 
historical reality of Christimity as it does that of Judaism?" 
She further asks, before God, whether Christians should not see 
themselves as being in the same historical situation as the Jews 
in that both of them are "still on the way through the desert 
between the Exodus and the Promised Land, with many a golden idol 
and broken tablet along the way" (1974:253).
Ignaz Maybaum expresses the above sentiments in terms of the 
Jewish diaspora. He points out that when the Jews call the 
diaspora galut, "this Hebrew connotation reminds us that both the 
State of Israel and the diaspora outside Israel are galut: as 
long as the Messiah has not yet come, every community lives in 
the galut, in the unredeemed history of man chosen to carry the 
yoke of the galut, moving in travail, in suffering and in hope 
towards the kingdom of God" (1973:174).
in order that Christians might realise the non-finality of the 
paradigm of Jesus, Ruether suggests that they must learn the 
story of the Jews after the time of Jesus. This history has been 
suppressed by Christianity because of her claim to being the new 
and true Israel. Ruether (1974:257), however, argues that such a 
method of learning history negates ongoing Jewish existence. ... 
For Christians to incorporate the Jewish tradition after Jesus
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into their theological and historical education would involve 
ultimately the dismantling of the Christian concept of history 
and the demythologizing of the myth of the Christian Era."
3. THE IMPLICATIONS OF RUETHER'S REINTERPRETED 
CHRISTIAN ESCHATOIOGICAL UNDERSTANDING
The implications of Ruether's reinterpretation of Christian 
eschatological thinking for the problem of religious pluralism 
are clear. "God, who creates the many peoples, also can allow 
for many ways to the Father, which only become one at the end of 
history which is truly "final" " (Ruether, 1974:260 - 261).
However, the same criticism can be levelled at Ruether as was 
levelled at Hick earlier, namely, that her call for a 
paradigmatic understanding of the story of Jesus is tantamount to 
robbing Christianity of its essence.
Nevertheless, it is very clear fr-m Ruether's analysis of 
Chr. tian teachings that these have provided the fuel for two 
millennia of Jewish persecution. The question must surely be 
asked whether an essence that promotes such atrocities is at all 
worthwhile pursuing. The call for a radical reinterpretation of 
Christian teachings on the part of many Christian theologians is, 
therefore, justified.
Driver (1981:10) points out that it is immoral for any religion
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to merely repeat or perpetuate a course of action simply because 
it existed in the past. Such an attitude causes a religion to 
mirror the past without critical reflection.
As far as Christianity is concerned, the fact that it claims to 
be an absolute faith, leaves little room for critical reflection 
on her central teachings. To do so is regarded as heretical.
In the light of our discussion above, however, it is evident that 
these teachings can no longer go unquestioned. "If the Church 
wants to clear itself of anti-Jewish trends built into its 
teaching, a few marginal correctives will not do. It must 
examine the very center of its proclamation and reinterpret the 
meaning of the gospel for our times" (Baum, 1974:5). As to 
whether or not this is possible without invalidating the 
Christian claims altogether is a frightening question.
One way of reinterpreting Christian truth-claims is to follow 
Hick and to regard the nature of the language used by the early 
Christians to speak about the divinity and uniqueness of Jesus as 
being mythic in nature. Hellwig (1970) suggests this approach 
as a starting point.
Driver (1981:24), suggests an ethical hermeneutic approach to 
Christology. He sees the current task of Christology as being 
"to define the role of Christ in the fulfillment of individual 
and social conscience." Therefore, he suggests that we "view
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Christ as a party to ethical development" rather than as its norm 
or ethical completion.
The basis for Driver's approach to Christology lies in his view 
that Christ, far from being outside or above the ethical history 
of the world, is radically within it. "This means that Christ 
also has an ethical history and is not forever the same." 
Therefore, Christians "should be prepared to meet Christ in forms 
not predicted in the New Testament" (Driver, 1981:24).
Ruether's revision of Christian eschatological thought was 
prompted by an ethical motive, namely, to indicate the disastrous 
(unethical) consequences of fc .lowing the New Testament to the 
letter. This causes her to reach the conclusion (held by most 
liberal Christian theologians) that some texts of the New 
Testament "may simply be unusable and will have to be put aside 
or relativized historically, not unlike other scriptural texts 
which condone practices which modern Christians no longer accept, 
such as slavery" (1974:232).
The implications of such an approach to the New Testament for the 
essence of Christianity have already been discussed in the 
earlier critique of the unitive pluralist school of thought. 
John Pawlikowski, however, suggests a more subtle approach to tb 
reinterpretation of the New Testament so as to do away with 
passages that convey an anti-Semitic flavour.
Firstly, he suggests that if the gospels are read with some
sophistication, they do present a case for basic Roman
*
responsibility for the death of Jesus, This is an issue that 
the churches have not yet squarely addressed (1980:29).
Secondly, with regard to Roamns 9 - 11, Pawlikowski points out 
that "Paul shows a greater love and respect for the continuing 
validity of Jewish religious expression" than many would care to 
admit (1980:29). He argues further that "what we can say is that 
Romans 9 - 1 1  undercuts any attempt by Christians to totally 
invalidate the meaningfulness and beauty of the Jewish religious 
covenant" (1980:30).
Thirdly, r-wlikowski points to a growing consensus as a result of 
recent Johannine studies, to the effect that the fourth gospel's 
condemnation of the Jews is limited to the specific community of 
the writer's day. Pawlikowski cites Raymond Brown as saying that 
the term, "the Jews", constitutes a theological category that 
symbolises any person, Christian or non-Christian, Jewish or 
pagan, who would reject with full knowledge the news of salvation 
through Christ (1980:12). On these grounds, therefore, 
Pawlikowski is convinced that it is possible to present the 
Johannine Christology without of necessity denigrating Judaism as 
such. Nevertheless, he doesn caution us to be aware that "the
*This theory is fully expounded in the following works; 
Brandon, S.G.F. (1967). Jesus and the Zealots.
Manchester: Manchester University Press; and Brandon, S.G.F. 
(1968). The Trial of Jesus of Nazareth, London: Batsford.
125
issue of the anti-Semitism of John is far from a settled 
question" (1980:30).
Fourthly, Pawlikowski points to new research on the issue of 
Jeuus' renunciation of the Pharisees. Such research has shown 
that a considerable part of the hostility towards the Pharisees 
may in fact be explained in terms of inter-Pharisaic 
contestation. Citing Paul Winter, Pawlikowski points out that 
Jesus might well have been a representative of pre-rabbinical 
Pharisaism, not only in his ethical teaching, but also in bis 
eschatology. Pawlikowski further quotes Winter as saying that in 
the whole of the New Testament we are unable to find a single 
historically reliable instance of religious differences between 
Jesus and members of the Pharisaic guild, let alone evidence of 
mortal conflict (1980:101).
Lastly, Pawlikowski notes that the attacks against so-called 
"Judaisers" (cf. Galatians) can be disposed of rather easily. He 
argues that many Jews, besides Paul, would also have objected to 
the rigidity in Torah interpretation that was followed by this 
group. Furthermore, he points out that it is also likely that 
these "Judaisers" were not even Jewish by birth (1980:31).
Thus, in te-ms of a reinterpretation of the anti-Semitic passages 
found in the New Testament, pawlikowski is adamant that when 
these passages are read without explanation, the average 
Christian may take them as being condemnations of Judaism as a
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4whole. "Here again we meet head-on the problem of background
material that remains unsolved at the popular level" (1980:31).
Ruether (1974:228), however, points out that "possibly anti-
aism is too deeply embedded in the foundations of Christianity
-o be rooted out entirely without destroying the whole 
structure." Thus she suggests that "we may h.ve to settle for 
the sort of ecumenical goodwill that lives with theoretical 
inconsistency and opts for a modus operand! that assures 
practical co-operation between Christianity and Judaism."
In any event, in terms of an eschatological perspective to the 
problem of religious pluralism, the final solution lies with God. -» 
In the meantime, however, Christianity is called to reinterpret 
past, absolutist claims (no matter how difficult this may be) 
lest the fratricide of the Holocaust be repeated. If Christians 
can come to terms with this approach to the problem of religious 
pluralism, the road will be paved for a genuine encounter with 
men of other faiths.
4. gUQ VADIS? THE WORLD PARLIAMENT OE RELIGIONS 
CENTENARY, 1993
The above discussion concentrated on the Judaeo-Christian 
eschatological conflict as a major issue in the conflicting 
truth-claims debate. At this point, however, I wish to return to 
the context of wider interreligious dialogue. Whilst an
. f
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eschatological approach to the problem of the conflicting truth- 
claims maintains the status quo between differing faiths until 
the end of time arrives, there is a definite need for a current 
praxis of interfaith whereby men of differing religious 
persuasions can seek to understand each other so that violent 
conflict can be avoided. The 'global village' has made the ideal 
of interfaith dialogue become a necessity. Indeed, much of the 
current political conflict is exacerbated by religious rivalry as 
can be observed, for example, in Lebanon and India. It therefore 
seems imperative for the very survival of the modern world that a 
solution be found to the problem of religious pluralism. A 
"brotherhood of man" will never be realised without it.
What follows, therefore, is a brief overview of certain key 
attempts at meaningful interfaith dialogue. This survey is done 
with a view to the anticipation of the planned World Parliament 
of Religions Centenary that is to take place in 199J.
In 1893, an attempt was made towards interfaith in the form of a
World Parliament of Religions. This Parliament sat in Chicago as
part of the Columbian Exposition which marked the fourth
centenary of Columbus' discovery of America. Ten religions were
represented by leaders from all over the world and the
*
proceedings lasted seventeen days.
*The full report of the proceedings of this Parliament can be 
found in Barrows, J.H, ed. (1893). The World's Parliament 
of Religions. Chicago: Parliament.
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4M.Bcaybrooke (1960:179) has outlined the main aims of this 
meeting as follows
1. To being together in conference for the first time in history
the leading representatives of the great historic religions
of the world.
2. To show men, in the most impressive way, what and how many
important truths the various religions hold and teach in
common.
3. to promote and deepen the spirit of human brotherhood among 
religious men of diverse faiths, through friendly conference 
and mutual good understanding, while not seeking to foster 
the temper of indifferentism, and not striving to achieve any’
formal and outward unity.
4. to set forth, by those most competent to speak, what are 
deemed the important distinctive truths held and taught by 
each religion and by the various chief branches of 
Christendom.
5. To indicate the impregnable foundations of Theism and the 
reasons for man's faith in immortality, and thus to unite and 
strengthen the forces which are adverse to a materialistic
philosophy of the universe.
6. To secure from leading scholars (representing the Brahman, 
Buddhist, Confucian, Parsee, Mohammedan, Jewish and other 
faiths, and from representatives of the various churches of 
Christendom) full and accurate statements of the spiritual 
and other effects of the religions which they hold, upon the
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4Literature, Art, Commerce, Government, DC istic and Social 
Life of the peoples among whom these faiths have prevailed.
7. To enquire what light each religion has afforded, or may 
afford, to the other religions of the world.
8. To set forth, for permanent record to be published to the 
world, an accurate and authoritative account of the present 
condition and outlook of religion among the leading nations 
of the earth.
9. To discover from competent men, what light religion has to 
throw on the great problems of the present age, especially 
important questions connected with Temperance, Labour, 
Education, Wealth and Poverty.
10. To bring the nations of the earth into a more friendly 
fellowship in the hope of securing permanent international 
peace.
Many looked upon this event as the dawn of a new era of mutual 
understanding between the different religions of the world. This 
was certainly one of the express aims of the Parliament. Alas, 
despite this attempt, the result was a reaffirmation, on the part 
of the Christian delegates present, of the superiority of the 
Christian faith. Barrows (189'7:312 - 313), the organiser, 
describes the results of the Parliament thus:
"It was generally felt and said by Christian ministers, 
journalists, and teachers, that the Christianity of Christ 
displayed its glorious supremacy, its peerless character from
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first to last, and some went so far as to affirm that the non- 
Christian religions would never be willing to appear again in a 
great world congress, and show their little tapers by the side of 
Christianity's solar orb."
Braybrooke (1980:8), however, is more positive in his assessment 
of the Parliament. He holds that: "whilst the Parliament seems 
to have been something of a seventeen-day wonder, and only 
possible because it was held under the auspices of an 
international exposition, it remains a remarkable pioneer event, 
and no subsequent interfaith gathering has come near to it in 
size or complexity."
A. Durwood Foster (1986), on the other hand, does not share the 
above view. He points out that with regard to the first aim, the 
Parliament fell short of covering the vast diversity of existing 
religions. Religious movements such as the Baha'i World Faith 
and Mormonism were quite deliberatelv excluded from 
participation. Also "the internal divisv^ uf historic faiths 
subsumed under common labels" were not adequately reflected at 
the Parliament (1986:D. As far as the achievement of the second 
aim is concerned, Foster comments that, instead of showing what 
the religions held in common, profound differences seemed to 
become more pronounced; especially between the Eastern religions 
as opposed to the Abrahamic faiths.
Foster is however not entirely negative about the outcome of the
tParliarrent. In his opinion (1986:2) the third goal in particular 
was fulfilled and has continued to be advanced since then by the 
process of interreligious dialogue. He further comments (1986:6) 
that whilst there was a majority party at the Parliament "which 
reaffirmed the integrity of existing denominations and 
traditions", there was also a minority party who "succeeded in 
adding the seventh goal regarding the sharing of light". It is 
precisely this "shared light" that began in 1893 which has not 
left things the sane but has inevitably brought about 
transformation of religious existence and identity.
The greatest failure of the Parliament, according to Foster 
(1986:6) lies in its lack of success in the implementation of the 
tenth goal. The ninety intervening years since 1893 have seen 
the most horrendous intervening events, many of which have been 
directly caused by interreligious strife.
Commenting on this failure on the part of the Parliament, Foster 
(1986:6) points out that "when we absolutize our own cause, 
religion gives us the freedom of conscience and the fanatic 
resolve to take life - to destroy others, not just randomly but 
rationally and systematically, as on the 1 killing fields' of 
Canbodia, as the current film depicts so horrifyingly". For 
this reason, therefore, many today pursue interreligious dialogue 
with new seriousness.
*The film to which Foster refers is: "The Killing Fields". 
This film deals with the horrors of the Vietnam conflict.
\
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Attempts at dialogue on a more enpathetic basis have been pursued 
since 1893 and have met with some success, albeit on a somewhat 
limited scale. Some more 'icent examples are cited below.
4.1 INTERFAITH IN AMERICA; THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
CHRISTIANS AND JEWS
During the 1920's, approximately three hundred years o£ anti- 
Semitism and anti-Catholicism came to a head with the violent 
activities of the Ku Klux Klan against Blacks, Jews and 
Catholics. In particular, a vicious wave of anti-Catholicism 
swept over the country in the 1928 Presidential Campaign in which 
A1 Smith, a Roman Catholic, had dared to present himself as a 
candidate.
This wave of hysteria was the motivation behind the organisation 
of the National Conference of Christians and Jews (NCCJ), 
commonly referred to as the 'interfaith' movement. This movement 
was a fusion of Catholics, Protestants and Jews who were 
dedicated to the principle of establishing a more united America 
on the grounds of the Judaeo-Christian dicta: "Thou shalt love 
the Lord thy God" and "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" 
(Hyatt, 1978:268 - 269). A series of programmes was introduced 
in order that the above aim be achieved.
Since its inception, the NCCJ has extended it programmes far 
beyond the promotion of mutual understanding between Jews and
Christians. Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism have also been included 
on the agenda of events. The movement now embraces a wide 
diversity of problems that stand in the path of its ultimate 
goal.
Alfred Wolf (1978:298) comments thus on the road ahead for 
interfaith: "The initial purpose of the interfaith movement was
to overcome prejudice, to change attitudes. This goal remains 
and must remain, as long as there is anti-Semitism or, for that
matter, anti-Catholicism, anti-Protestantism, anti-Islamism, or 
any hatred rooted in religious differences. At the same time,
mutual understanding has matured sufficiently so that we can 
enter into a new phase of interreligious activity: to search for 
joint goals and for mutual interests, to labour together for the 
common good."
4.2 VATICAN II
The initiation of the Second Vatican Council (1962 - 1965) by 
Pope John XXIII (d. 1963) was a major turning-point for
interfaith movements. The "Declaration on the relationship of 
the Church to non-Christian religions" that emerged from this 
council stands out as a "watershed" in the field of 
interreligious dialogue. As far as Jewish/Christian dialogue is 
concerned, this council cleared the Jews of the charge of deicide 
and recognised the right of religious liberty for all.
Furthernote, it supported all efforts at the prom ->ion of mutual
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understanding between the various religions of mankind.
Paul Knitter (1985:124), however, emphasises that however 
positive the attitude of Vatican II towards other non-Christian 
religions may be, "we cannot deny a residual ambiguity in its 
understanding of just how effective the truth and grace within 
the religions are and, especially, how far Christian dialogue 
with them can go." The ambiguity, he argues, "stems from the 
same tension between God's salvific will and the necessity of the 
church that is evident throughout the history of Catholic
V  thought. Although the council has said some very new and
J
positive things about the religions, it still maintains that 
'the Church is necessary for salvation' and that 'it is through 
Christ's Catholic Church alone, which is the all-embracing means 
of salvation, that the fullness of the means of salvacion can be 
found.'"
Michael Wyschogrod (1982), on the other hand sees the Council as
representing "a new stage in Jewish-Christian dialogue". In this
*
article he praises two books that were written by Roman 
Catholics who have taken the contents of the document 'Nostra 
Aetate', which deals specifically with the attitude of the 
Catholic Church towards Judaism, to heart by attempting a 
meaningful dialogue between them without demeaning Judaism in any
*The books under review are: Tho.na, C. (1980). A Christian 
Theology of Judaism, tr. H.Croner. New Yorks Paulist 
press; and Mussner, P. (1979). Traktat fiber die Juden. 
Mflnchens Kosel Verlag.
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Despite these differing opinions on the value of Vatican II for 
interreligious dialogue between these two faiths, at least with 
the official backing of Rome behind attempts at interfaith, the 
road was now cleared for the majority of Catholic clergy, who had 
at first been hostile to such movements, to participate in their 
activities.
4.3 THE TEMPLE OF UNDERSTANDING, INC.
This organisation was founded in 1960 by Mrs Dickerman Hollister. 
It is a "nonprofit corporation dedicated to education about the 
world's religions, and to the proposition that education will 
bring an understanding on which the religions may build a future 
of co-operation and mutual rospect" (Dunne, 1970:210).
Under its auspices, the First Spiritual Summit Conference was 
held in Calcutta in October, 1968. At this event, papers were 
presented on the topic: "The Relevance of Religion in the Modern 
World", by delegates who represented a vast variety of world 
religions.
In a declaration that was unanimously adopted by the delegates at 
this Conference, the sentiment was expressed that the Conference 
had "demonstrated that interreligious communication is possible 
and fruitful" (Dunne, 1970:208), It was also felt that all
religions should actively seek increased communication with one 
another and together speak to the total human community in order 
to assist in creating conditions for the better world.
The dele, ates at the Summit Conference further gave the Temple of 
Understanding the mandate to implement the guidelines for 
interreligious communication and to create pools of information 
on the world religions and develop facilities to create materials 
for the mass-media.
Since 1968, the Temple has organised many international 
conferences with a view to promoting the above ideals and has 
become a strong force in the interfaith movement.
4.4 THE WORLD CONFERENCE ON RELIGION AND PEACE (WCRP)
This interfaith orjanisation was established in 1970. The main
aim of this body was to gather men and women of whatever faith
with a view to sharing their concerns about those things which
*
serve as a threat to world peace.
Since its inception it has hosted four international conferences, 
at the following venues$-
*For a detailed survey of the activities of this movement, 
see: Braybrooke, M. (1980). Inter-faith Organisations 1893 
-1979: An historical directory. New York: Edwin Mellen 
Press, pp. 70 - 90.
1. Kyoto, Japan (1970). Therre "Religion for Peace".
2. , Louvain, Belgium (1974). Theme: "Religion and the quality
of life".
3. Princeton, U.S.A. (1979). Theme; "Religion in the struggle
for world community".
4. Nairobi, Kenya (1984). "Religions for human dignity
and world peace".
This movement currently enjoys support worldwide among a wide 
spectrum of world religions. Unfortunately, these religionists 
are not the policy makers of international governments. In an 
age in which religion and politics are seen to be two separate 
entities, their influence on world politics has thus far been 
minimal. It therefore seems that the tenth goal of the World 
Parliament of Religions remains far from realisation despite 
attempts at world peace.
4.5 THE BIRMINGHAM CQNB'BRENCB; TRIALOGUE BETWEEN JEW/. CHRISTIAN 
AND MUSLIM
Ignaz Maybaum (1973) had recognised in the Middle-East Crisis, a 
grave need for mutual understanding between Judaism, Christianity 
and Islam. He emphasised the point that such a trialogue can 
only be pursued in a situation where these three faiths can 
rerain separate entities as "brothers in doctrinal disagreement" 
(1973:44).
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It was in this spirit that a conference of Jews, Christians and
Muslims was held on the initiative of John Hick at the University
of Birmingham in September, 1981. The aim of the conference was
to make a contribution to the promotion of meaningful dialogue
*
between the great Abrahamic faiths.
Ben Bngelbrecht (1981a:1 - 2) cites Hick's report on the 
conference as stating that if dialogue between differing faiths 
is to be fully realistic and at all relevant r it would ultimately 
have to include all of the great world faiths. This sentiment 
was agreed to by all present.
5. SYNTHESIS
From these few examples, it is clear that the wheel of interfaith 
is in motion. In 1993, however, it is hoped that a centenary of 
the World Parliament of Religions will take place. This event is 
currently being planned under the auspices of the Unification 
Church.
In this regard, an interfaith conference has already taken place 
(November 1985) at McAffee, New Jersey. There, a far greater 
representation of the multiplicity of world faiths was evident
*For a detailed report on the proceedings of this Conference, 
see: Bngelbrecht, B. (1981). "Die Familie van Abraham."
Unpublished. A report submitted to the H.S.R.C. on the 
Jewish-Chr istian-Muslim Conference held at the University of 
Birmingham, 21 - 24 September, 1981.
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/than was the case in 1893. A second conference is planned for 
1989 and the third (1993) will coincide with the centenary of the 
Parliament.
With all that has taken place since 1893 in the realm of
interfaith activity, the centenary can surely not be dictated to
by a call for the Absoluteness of any particular faith. It is
therefore hoped that the results of the centenary Parliament will 
be radically different from that of its great-grandparent and 
that the spark towards mutual understanding that was begun in
1893 will become an even larger flame.
If God is working his purpose out in history, then right now it 
seems that he is calling mankind to realise that the differing 
religions of the world are various ways of reaching the divine. 
He is calling us to participate in interfaith dialogue for the 
realisation of the "final" eschatological era; the "brotherhood 
of man".
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